# 1AC

### Plan

***The authority of the President of the United States to use or deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to an armed attack without a prior declaration of war from the United States Congress should be substantially restricted.***

***“Armed attack” should be defined as: The use of force of a magnitude that is likely to produce serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable destruction of property.***

**Contention 1: Wars of Choice**

#### They’re inevitable in the status quo:

***First - Commitment trap --- lack of congressional war power causes presidential utterances to become de facto strategy --- this locks us into unnecessary conflicts***

**Brookings Institution** 6-20-20**13**, The Road to War: Presidential Commitments and Congressional Responsibility, <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/06/20-war-presidential-power>, jj

**Ever since WWII**, Kalb said that “**history has led us into conflicts that we don’t understand” because presidents do not seek approval from Congress for declarations of war**. ***The country has reached a point now where “presidential power is so great, words out of his mouth become policy for the United States***.” **Kalb used the Syrian civil war and** President **Obama’s “red line” policy as an example of how a president’s words become strategy for the United States**. Kalb argued **that this presidential “flexibility” in foreign policy decision-making has repeatedly led the country into one misguided war to the next such as the Vietnam and Iraq wars**. ***To nullify these poor decisions***, Kalb believes that ***formal congressional declarations of war will help “trigger the appreciation for the gravity of war*” and assist in “unifying the nation” behind a strategic military intervention, resulting in more positive outcomes for the United States**. ¶ He concluded his remarks by noting that ***declarations of war by Congress are “stark commitments*,” and statements by the president of the United States must be thoroughly discussed to make well-informed decisions that will be in the best interest of the American people**. **Conflicts must be understood before the decision is made to send American troops to war, and presidents of the United States should converse with Congress before taking any military action.**

***Second - Groupthink – Comprehensive analysis proves absent sustained congressional involvement in war-making – unnecessary interventions are inevitable***

**Martin ’11**, Craig Martin, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law, Winter, 2011¶ Brooklyn Law Review¶ 76 Brooklyn L. Rev. 611, ARTICLE: Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force in Compliance with In-ternational Law, Lexis, jj

II. The Causes of War

**In beginning to think about how to improve the legal constraints on the resort to war, it is essential to consider the causes of international armed conflict**. n10 The question of what causes war is the subject of a massive amount of re-search and debate, stretching back literally thousands of years. n11 **The focus of the various theories on the causes of war range from the individual decision makers, through small-group dynamics, the structure of the state itself, all the way to the structure and operation of the international system of states**. n12 Thucydides, whose analysis of the Peloponnesian War is one of the earliest studies of the subject known to us, set the stage with a complex explanation for the causes of that war that included the individual attributes of decision makers, the nature and structure of the leading city-states, and the nature of the interstate system itself. n13 Kenneth Waltz continues this classification by defining the three levels as "Images": the individual or human level ("Image I"), the level of the state structure or organization ("Image II"), and the level of the international system ("Image III"). n14 And despite the differing theories, disagreements, and areas of emphasis, there is a widely shared acceptance that all three Images play a role in explaining the causes of war, albeit to varying degrees [\*617] depending on one's theoretical perspective. n15 While it is not necessary for us to examine the various theories in detail, it will be helpful to get a flavor for some of the more important ideas as they relate to each of the three Images, as I will refer back to these ideas to support the argument for the proposed Model.

A. Image I--The Level of the Individual

**There are a wide variety of theories, and indeed a number of different sublevels within the Image I--the individual level--perspective on the causes of war. Some of these focus on aspects such as human nature itself and the inherent aggression of ~~man~~**. n16 **But the theories that relate to both the psychology of decision makers, and a number of systemic problems in small-group decision making are of greatest significance for the argument being advanced here**. **Beginning with individual psychology, one set of theories focus on the personality traits that are common among those who tend to reach the highest offices of government as factors that contribute to unsound judgments regarding the use of armed force**. **Empirical studies suggest that a number of traits that tend to be overrepresented in national leaders--such as au-thoritarian and domineering tendencies, introversion** (which is perhaps counter-intuitive, but Hitler and Nixon are both prime examples of this trait), **narcissism, and high-risk tolerance--also tend to correlate with much higher levels of con-frontation and the use of force to resolve conflicts**. n17

Psychological theories also focus on problems of misperception. **There is powerful evidence that people are prone to systematic patterns of misperception, and that such misperception in government leaders contributes significantly to irrational decisions**. n18 In particular, **decision makers frequently form strong hypotheses regarding the intentions** [\*618] **and capabilities of potential adversaries, and there is a strong tendency to then dismiss or discount information that is inconsistent with the hypothesis, and to interpret ambiguous information in a manner that is consistent with and reinforces the hypothesis**. n19 **Such misperception often constitutes a significant factor in the path to war**. n20

Another set of theories that relate to the Image I causes of war focus not on the individual alone, but on how deci-sions are made within groups and organizations. Contrary to the expectation that government agencies generally operate in accordance with rational choice theory, **studies suggest that group decision making is often characterized by dynamics that can lead to irrational and suboptimal decisions**. One such characteristic is excessive "incrementalism" and "satisfycing"--the tendency to make small incremental policy shifts, coupled with the sequential analysis of options and adoption of the first acceptable alternative, a process captured in the aphorism "the good is the enemy of the best." n21 **A second theory suggests that the dynamic of competing bureaucratic and departmental interests--interests which are often inconsistent with the larger national interest, but which nonetheless command greater loyalty and mobilize greater effort among department or division members--subvert the decision-making process**. n22 **Moreover, each department will itself approach the decision making within the constraints of its own perspectives and mindsets, standard operating procedures, and capabilities. This is the famous "where you stand is where you sit" explanation of internal government politics**, n23 **often referred to as the** [\*619] "**bureaucratic politics model**." n24 For **example, the senior representatives of the U.S. Air Force, with obviously vested interests, strongly argued in favor of the continued strategic bombing of North Vietnam in 1967, even though the Secretary of Defense and others in the Nixon administration had determined that it was at best pointless and at worst counterproductive**. n25

**Finally, there is the phenomenon known as "*groupthink***." n26 **This theory suggests that some decision-making groups--particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfi-dence, and a shared world view or value system--suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis during the decision-making process**. n27 **Decision-making groups that suffer from groupthink are particularly vulnerable to the kind of systemic misperception discussed above, but they suffer from other weaknesses as well, all stemming from a failure to challenge received wisdom, consider alternate perspectives, or bring to bear exogenous criteria or modalities in assessing policy options**. n28

These theories do not, of course, explain all of the problems in decision making in all situations. Groupthink and the bureaucratic politics model generally do not operate at the same time in the same groups. But **the studies of each of these phenomena suggest that these systemic patterns can be a significant factor in the less-than-rational and suboptimal decision making about the use of armed force.** **And these theories together show the importance of introducing exogenous criteria for assessing the merit of competing policy options, and the kinds of checks and balances that might lessen the probability that these tendencies could affect the decision to go to war.** [\*620]

B. Image II--The Level of the State

**The causes of war also operate at the level of the state itself. Again, there is an extensive range of theoretical ex-planations for the causes of war that focus on factors at the state level, but those that are central to Image II relate to the actual structure or form of the government of the state**. n29 **The essential idea is that some forms of government are inherently less prone to wage war than others**. **This idea has been central to liberal theories of the state and international relations since the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the argument that liberal democratic states are less inclined to initiate wars than autocratic or other nondemocratic states**. These arguments were founded upon a number of strands of liberal political theory, including the nature of individual rights within democracies and the manner in which respect for such rights would influence how the state would behave within the international society. n30 They also drew upon liberal ideas about the influence of capitalist economies, arguing that laissez-faire capitalist systems would operate to reduce the incentives for war in liberal democratic states. n31 But **perhaps the most important argument among these liberal claims, is that the very structure of government, both in terms of its leaders being representative of and directly accountable to an electorate, and the separation of political power between the executive and a more broadly representative legislature, would operate to reduce the likelihood that such governments would embark on military adventures**. n32

Rousseau and Madison both wrote about the ramifications of the democratic structure of the state on the propensity for war. n33 But it was Immanuel Kant who developed the argument most fully in the eighteenth century with his [\*621] short work Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. n34 Writing at a time when there were less than a handful of fledgling democratic "republics" in the world, n35 **Kant argued that a perpetual peace would result from the spread of the republican form of government among the nations of the world and the development of a form of pacific federation among these free states**. n36 His argument thus straddled the second and third images, and I will return to discuss his overall theory more fully below when we turn to consider Image III. But one of his arguments for why republics would be inherently less likely to wage war is still very much at the heart of current liberal theories relating to Image II. His point was that, **in the kind of republic he envisioned, the consent of citizens would be required for decisions to go to war**. **Those who would "call[] down on themselves all the miseries of war," not only fighting and dying in the conflict but also paying for it and suffering the resulting debt, would be much less likely to agree to such an adventure than the heads of state in other kinds of political systems such as monarchies, who can "decide on war, without any significant reason**." n37

As we will see, Kant himself did not argue that the development of democratic structures within any given state would be sufficient to prevent it from going to war, and his theory of perpetual peace also rested on the requirement that the republican form of government be also spread throughout the international system. Indeed, **one of the problems with liberal theories that rely upon governmental structure as an explanation for the cause of war is that the extensive empirical research and analysis on the subject suggest that liberal democracies are almost as prone to engaging in war as nondemocratic states, at least as against nondemocratic countries**. n38 **Some have tried to argue that liberal democracies nonetheless do not initiate wars to the same degree, and thus** [\*622**] are inherently less aggressive than other forms of government, but even that claim is very difficult to sustain from the perspective of traditional international law conceptions of aggression and self-defense**. n39

What has emerged from this line of research, however, is the widely accepted proposition that liberal democracies do not commence wars against other liberal democracies. The so-called "democratic peace" encompasses both this empirical fact and the principle said to explain it. n40 While there remains some residual debate over the validity of the principle, n41 persuasive evidence suggests that, with the possible exception of two instances of armed conflict between what might be considered democratic states, there have been no wars between liberal democracies during the period between 1816 and 1965. n42 The assertion has been made, and often cited, that the democratic peace is close to being an empirical law in international relations. n43

**There is less agreement over the best explanation for the democratic peace. There are two main theoretical posi-tions: (1) normative and cultural explanations, and (2) institutional and structural constraints**. n44 The normative-cultural explanations argue that the shared norms of democracies, and particularly the shared adherence to the rule of law and commitment to peaceful dispute resolution internally, inform and influence the approach of democratic governments to [\*623] resolving disputes that may arise as between democracies. Moreover, there is a shared respect for the rights of other people who live in a similar system of self-government. These shared beliefs, norms and expectations tip the cost-benefit analysis toward peaceful resolution of disputes when they arise as among democracies. n45

**The structural-institutional advocates argue that the elements of the liberal democratic legal and political system operate to constrain the government from commencing armed conflicts**. **This is entirely in line with the insights of earli-er writers such as Madison, Kant, and Cobden, regarding the lower likelihood of war when representatives of those who will pay and die for the war are deciding, since it is more politically risky for democratic leaders to gamble the blood and treasure of the nation in war unless it is clearly viewed by the public as being necessary**. n46 **The arguments are also based in part on the broader idea that structural checks and balances typical of democratic systems, and the operation of certain other institutional features of deliberative democracy, will reduce the incidence of war**. n47 We will return to some of these arguments in more detail below.

***Third - Lack of public awareness about war power issues allows uninhibited intervention***

**Druck ’12**, Judah A. Druck, B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; Notes Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98, November, 2012¶ Cornell Law Review¶ 98 Cornell L. Rev. 209, NOTE: DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLO-GY-DRIVEN WARFARE, Lexis, jj¶

The War Powers Resolution in the Era of Technology-Driven Warfare

A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today

**If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law** (namely, the WPR), **then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad**. n135 As a result, **fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives**. **But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be con-cerned about the American public's increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes.**

**First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially**. n136 **Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone**. **When ma-chines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public** (and, as a result, politicians and courts) **will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad**, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm.

But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense "wake up the populace" in order to check potentially unconstitutional action. n137 [\*232] Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny?

The answer is that **a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable**. n138 Indeed, **one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place**. n139 ***The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation***. Therefore, **while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation**. n140 **That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground**. n141 **In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare**. n142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact. n143 **If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones**. n144 As such, **whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves** n145 **or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a** [\*233**] populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare**. n146

Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian con-cerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, **the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash**. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, **the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place "enormous trust in our leaders" despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy**. n147 Accordingly, **as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad**. n148 **At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.** n149

***The impact is imperialism, militarism and aggressive foreign policy – the aff is key***

**Fisher ’05**, LOUIS FISHER, Specialist with the Law Library, The Library of Congress. Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, Indiana Law Journal¶ Fall, 2005¶ 81 Ind. L.J. 1199, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, LEXIS, jj

**The initiation of U.S. military operations in Iraq flowed from a long list of miscalculations, false claims, and misjudgments, both legal and political. Errors of that magnitude were not necessary or inevitable. Military conflict could have been delayed**, perhaps **permanently, had the responsible political leaders performed their constitutional duties with greater care, reflection, integrity, and commitment to constitutional principles**. Adding to the failures of elected officials were decades of irresponsible and misinformed statements by federal judges, academics, law reviews, and the media.¶ **Although the Iraq War that began in 2003 was orchestrated by the Republican Party and the Bush administration, their miscalculations built upon a half century of violations of constitutional principles over the war power**. **Democratic Presidents led the country to war against North Korea** (President Harry Truman), North **Vietnam** (President Lyndon Johnson), **and Serbia** (President Bill Clinton). **Republican neoconservatives beat the drums for war against Iraq, but Democratic academics did the same for Korea**. **The dominant theme in American foreign policy since World War II has been a bellicose spirit that champions the use of military force, boasts the virtues of "American exceptionalism," stands ready to fight "evil" anywhere** (**whether Soviet Communism or Islamic fundamentalism), and regularly attacks opponents of war as unpatriotic and unmanly**. **That these forces led to torture by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib or CIA "black sites" should come as no surprise. They are the natural results of concentrated power, political arrogance, and ideological fervor.**

### Contention 2: Cult of the Presidency

***Politics is ceded to the president now --- Americans believe the president will solve all problems --- that ensures an unrestrained imperial president --- only increasing public deliberation on the presidency allows a reinvigoration of politics***

Gene **Healy ‘09** is an American political pundit, journalist and editor. Healy is a Vice President at the libertarian think tank Cato Institute, as well as a contributing editor to Liberty magazine. Cult of the Presidency : America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power. Washington, DC, USA: The Cato Institute, 2009. p 2-3. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10379710&ppg=12 Copyright © 2009. The Cato Institute. All rights reserved.

Nearly six years earlier, September 11 had inspired similar rhetorical excess, but with far greater consequence. The week after the attacks, President Bush invoked America’s ‘‘responsibility to history’’ and declared that we would ‘‘answer these attacks and rid the world of evil .’’ 5 A mission that vast would seem to require equally vast powers. And the Bush administration has made some of the broadest assertions of executive power in American history: among them, the power to launch wars at will, to tap phones and read e-mail without a warrant, and to seize American citizens on American soil and hold them for the duration of the War on Terror— in other words, perhaps forever— without ever having to answer to a judge. Those assertions have justifiably given rise to fears of a new Imperial Presidency. Yet, many of the same people who condemn the growing concentration of power in the executive branch also embrace a virtually limitless notion of presidential responsibility. **Today, politics is as bitterly partisan as it’s been in three decades, and the Bush presidency is at the center of the fight. But amid all the bitterness, it’s easy to miss the fact that, at bottom, both Left and Right agree on the boundless nature of presidential responsibility. Neither Left nor Right sees the president as the Framers saw him: a constitutionally constrained chief executive with an important, but limited job: to defend the country when attacked, check Congress when it violates the Constitution, enforce the law— and little else**. Today, for conservatives as well as liberals, it is the president’s job to protect us from harm, to ‘‘grow the economy,’’ to spread democracy and American ideals abroad, and even to heal spiritual malaise— whether it takes the form of a ‘‘sleeping sickness of the soul,’’ as Hillary Clinton would have it, or an ‘‘if it feels good, do it’’ ethic, as diagnosed by George W. Bush. 6 **Few Americans find anything amiss in the notion that it is the president’s duty to solve all large national problems and to unite us all in the service of a higher calling. The vision of the president as national guardian and redeemer is so ubiquitous that it goes unnoticed**. Is that vision of the presidency appropriate for a self-governing republic? Is it compatible with limited, constitutional government? The book you’re holding argues that it is not. **Americans’ unconfined conception of presidential responsibility is the source of much of our political woe and some of the gravest threats to our liberties. If the public expects the president to deal with all national problems, physical or spiritual, then the president will seek— or seize— the power necessary to handle that responsibility. We’re right to fear the growth of presidential power. But the Imperial Presidency is the price of making the office the focus of our national hopes and dreams.**

***Deliberation about war powers is key to check the unitary executive --- policy relevant debate about war powers decision-making is critical to hold the government accountable for their hypocrisy --- only engaging specific proposals and learning the language of the war-machine solves***

Ewan E. **Mellor** – European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences, Graduate Student, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 20**13**, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, online

**This section of the paper considers** more generally **the need for** just war **theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force**, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. **It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice**,35 **as well as on** Michael **Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society**.36 It argues that **the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.**”37¶ Kelsay argues that:¶ [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38¶ He also argues that “**good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation**, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 **This is important as it highlights the need for** just war **scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved**. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. **Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”**40 **in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms**.¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. **The** just war **theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices**. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 **the** just war **theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted**.42 **It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to**¶ **demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values**.43 **The tradition** itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, **constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.**44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 **By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis**.¶ **Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is**, as Clausewitz stated, **a continuation of policy**. **War**, according to Clausewitz, **is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued**.47 ***Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship***.48 ***This engagement must bring*** just war ***theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers***, **however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power**. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition **the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language**. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 **it is incumbent upon** just war **theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account**. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, **it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies**.”51

***Without deliberation about the presidency, progressive politics is impossible --- conservative social movements will inevitably engage the presidency --- the left can only be effective by recognizing that politics flows through the presidency --- the global uniquely shapes the local in this context***

Institutional focus is key – any other starting point ignores the primacy of the presidency to American politics ---

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**This article analyzes the often fraught yet sometimes productive relationship between the modern presidency and social movements**. Although the presidency-social movement nexus is fraught with tension, ***collaboration between the White House and social activists was indispensable to the important changes that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century***. **Focusing especially on** Lyndon **Johnson's uneasy but critical relationship to the civil rights movement** and Ronald Reagan's enlistment of the Christian Right into the Republican Party, **we trace the emergence of a novel form of politics since the 1960s that joins executive prerogative, grassroots insurgency, and party polarization**. **Johnson's efforts to leverage presidential power to advance civil rights played a critical role in recasting the relationship between national administration and social movements**, one that paved the way for a national conservative offensive. The relationship forged between Johnson and the civil rights movement has echoes in the similar joining of the Reagan presidency and the Christian Right, an executive-insurgency alliance that instigated the transformation of the Republican Party and spurred the development a new presidency-centered party system by the end of the 1980s.

**This article explores the relationship between the modern presidency and social movements, an uneasy but critical alliance in the quest for both liberal and conservative reform during the past half-century**. Focusing on Lyndon Johnson's relationship to the civil rights movement and Ronald Reagan's collaboration with the Christian Right, **we explore the idea**, born of the Progressive era, **that the presidency is inherently disposed to ally itself with major reform movements**. **Presidency scholars, like many citizens, regularly perceive occupants of the Oval Office as leading agents of change in a labyrinthine political system that can be difficult to navigate**. Social movement scholars, in turn, associate social and political transformation with organized, collective insurgencies of ordinary people motivated by common purposes or social solidarities. By definition, social movements are, to borrow James Jasper's words, "conscious, concerted, and relatively sustained efforts by organized groups ... to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means" (1999, 5).

**Although both presidents and social movements have played leading roles in the development of major legal and policy innovation over the course of American political development, the respective literatures on executive power and insurgency rarely intersect**. **Salutary efforts to probe the subject tend to emphasize the inherent conflict between a centralizing institution tasked with conserving the constitutional order and grassroots associations dedicated to structural change** (e.g., see Riley 1999; Sanders 2007). **To be sure, the relationship between presidents and insurgents is fraught with tension; nonetheless, it has significant formative potential given the ambition and capacity of both actors under opportune conditions to transform the political order**. For all of their differences, ***the ambitions and work of presidents and movements are sometimes complementary rather than antagonistic.***

Our central point is that the emergence of **the modern presidency recasts in important ways the relationship between executive power and social movements**. Constrained by constitutional norms, the separation and division of powers, and a decentralized party system, the disruptive potential of executive power was often limited until the twentieth century. **With the advent of the modern presidency during the Progressive era**, however, **the White House was more likely to challenge the existing order of things**. To be sure, modern executives regularly have shied away from close relationships with controversial social movements and sometimes openly attacked them (Tichenor 1999, 2007). Nonetheless, ***the consolidation of the modern presidency during the New Deal realignment invested the executive with powers and public expectations that made it a critical agent of social and economic reform*** (Milkis 1993). **Once the White House became the center of growing government commitments, its occupants were more likely to profess support for the same high ideals that prominent social movements in their camps championed** (Miroff 1981,14).

**The idea that the executive office might act as a spearhead for social justice-a rallying point for democratic reform movements-reached a critical juncture during the Johnson presidency**. **The nation received glimpses of the transformational possibilities of presidential-movement collaborations during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy**. But they also demonstrated the deep conflicts of interest and ideology that inherently divided presidents and movements. **Only with Lyndon Johnson was the full panoply of modern presidential powers-political, administrative, and rhetorical-deployed on behalf of insurgent interests and demands**. Johnson claimed broad authority to transform domestic policy on his own terms at a time when Congress and parties were subordinate to a "modern" presidency at high tide and a national administration unprecedentedly expansive. This also was a period when the civil rights movement's ability to blend and balance disruptive collective action and conventional political pressure was at its zenith. Consequently, **Johnson and the civil rights movement formed a more direct, combustible, and transformative relationship than was true of previous collaborations between presidents and social movements** (Milkis and Tichenor 2011). **The result was both a historic body of civil rights reforms** and enormous political fallout for Johnson and the Democratic Party.

**A little more than a decade later, a new executive-insurgency alliance spurred a national conservative offensive**. Like Johnson, Reagan commanded a strong and active presidency that reshaped national law and policy commitments, but he sought to deploy modern executive power to achieve conservative objectives. Some of these purposes, most notably a more aggressive anti-Communist agenda and the protection of "family values," required the expansion rather than the rolling back of national governmental responsibilities. Moreover, by the time Ronald Reagan became president, cultural forces unleashed by the Great Society had created a more polarized political environment. **Reagan's contribution to the development of a decidedly right of center modern Republican Party, pledged to advance issues of critical importance to Christian conservatives, made the GOP an attractive venue for the forging a strong bond between the White House and Christian Right**. As we shall see, **the fact that Christian conservatives were less suspicious of executive power than civil rights activists had been might have diminished the Christian Right's reformist potential**. **Yet with their impressive march through American political institutions, these religious movement activists joined with Reagan in advancing a more centralized, polarized, and programmatic party system that defied national consensus and enduring reform, and appeared to issue, instead, a rancorous struggle between conservatives and liberals for control of the modern executive office.**

The two cases examined in this article thus shed light on important developments in American politics. Johnson's alliance with the civil rights movement and Reagan's ties with the Christian right mark critical episodes in the confluence of executive prerogative and insurgency that both infused politics with moral fervor and sharpened conflict between liberals and conservatives. By the end of the 1980s, these new strains had formed into a novel form of party politics that joined presidential prerogative, grassroots mobilization, and partisan polarization. We seek to take account of this transformation of American politics in the conclusion, suggesting that the **critical, tense alliances presidents have forged with social movements over the past half-century have advanced reforms and visions of an alternative political order**-but at the risk of weakening the means of common deliberation and public judgment, the very practices that nurture a civic culture.

***We must engage the presidency --- focus on purely local politics contributes to the decline of liberalism and resurgence of conservative moments***

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For a time, **LBJ's "careful practicality" and moral leadership made him an indispensable ally of the civil rights movement**. His greatest strength as majority leader of the Senate had been personal persuasion, a talent he now used to convince the Senate Republican leader, Everett Dirksen, to endorse the 1964 civil rights bill and enlist moderate Republicans in the cause. This support came with a price. Dirksen insisted on compromises that reduced the power of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and limited the authority of the Justice Department to bring suits against businesses to those situations in which a clear "pattern and practice" of discrimination existed.3 These compromises addressed moderate Republicans' distaste for overlapping bureaucracies and excessive litigation, as well as their desire to protect northern and western businesses from intrusive federal agencies. Still, the principal objective of the civil rights bill-eliminating entrenched segregation in the South-was preserved.¶ Dirksen's support of the civil rights bill also followed from the senator's perception, confirmed by the president's successful southern tour, that public opinion had turned in favor of civil rights. Investing the power and prestige of his office in a cause and a movement, Johnson persuaded Dirksen and most members of Congress that civil rights reform could no longer be resisted. As Dirksen put it, paraphrasing Victor Hugo's diary, "No army is stronger than an idea whose time has come."4 Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964.¶ **Throughout the fight for this legislation, Johnson drew strength from and collaborated with civil rights leaders, even seeking their support for his decision not to delay signing the bill until Independence Day**.5 More controversially, most civil rights activists accepted the compromise that the Johnson White House struck with Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) at the 1964 Democratic Convention, which included seating of the regular Mississippi delegation.6 In return, the deal included the symbolic gesture of making MFDP delegates honored guests at the convention, with two of its members seated as special delegates at large, and a prohibition of racial discrimination in delegate selection at the 1968 convention. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Committee of Racial Equality (CORE) assailed the White House for sacrificing the MFDP's moral cause on the altar of expediency. But the MFDP, through its lawyer Joseph Rauh, joined King and most moderate civil rights leaders in swallowing the compromise.7 Not only were southern states threatening to walk out of the convention if the regular Mississippi delegation was purged, but Johnson and Democratic leaders also warned civil rights leaders that an unruly convention would cost the party the support of several border states and deprive Democrats of a chance to win a historic landslide-and a mandate for further reform.8¶ Just as important, Johnson's support for a nondiscrimination rule would have enormous long-term consequences for the Democratic Party. Previously, state parties had sole authority to establish delegate selection procedures. Johnson's proposed solution to the MFDP compromise established the centralizing principle that henceforth the national party agencies would decide not only how many votes each state delegation got at the national convention, but also would enforce uniform rules on what kinds of persons could be selected (Milkis 1993, 210-16). 9¶ Having gained credibility with civil rights leaders during the first critical year of his presidency, **Johnson solidified an alliance with them during the dramatic prelude to the 1965 voting rights legislation that ultimately enfranchised millions of African Americans**. New archival materials, specifically the Johnson Tapes, clarify that **Johnson did not want to go slow after the 1964 act. LBJ not only pushed aggressively to continue the advance of civil rights, but also seemed to welcome the movement's ability to disrupt politics-as-usual and to spur action**. On January 15, 1965, for instance, Johnson put in a call to King urging more grassroots protest that would increase pressure on Congress by dramatizing "the worst conditions [of blacks being denied the vote] that you can run into . . . If you can take that one illustration and get it on the radio, get on the television, get it in the pulpits, get it in the meetings-every place you can-then pretty soon the fellow who didn't do anything but drive a tractor would say, 'Well, that is not right- that is not fair.'¶ Johnson later might have had second thoughts about this importunity, since King and civil rights activists would take direct action in Selma, Alabama, that aroused massive resistance from local police and state troopers as well as national demonstrations in support of the marchers, some of which were directed at the president for not taking immediate action to avert the violence. Nonetheless, when King sought his public endorsement of the Selma campaign, Johnson championed the demonstrators' cause despite the efforts of White House aides to shield him from public involvement in the crisis. "I should like to say that all Americans should be indignant when one American is denied the right to vote ... all of us should be concerned with the efforts of our fellow Americans to register to vote in Alabama," Johnson said. "I intend to see that the right [to vote] is secured for all our citizens."11¶ In March of 1965, as the crisis in Selma worsened, Johnson delivered his famous voting rights message to Congress. His speech warned that the enactment of the voting rights bill was but one front in a larger war that must include not just federal laws to throw open the "gates of opportunity," but also affirmative action against ignorance, ill health, and poverty that would enable individual men and women to "walk through those gates." As he memorably closed, "Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome" (Johnson 1965a).¶ LBJ had not won over southern congressmen, most of whom slumped in their seats as the joint session erupted in applause. Yet he had triumphed where FDR failed- without embroiling himself in an enervating purge campaign against conservative Democrats, as Roosevelt had in 1938, he joined civil rights activists to discredit southern resistance to racial justice.12 Dr. King, watching the speech on television in Montgomery, Alabama, was moved to tears. As he wrote of the historical address, "President Johnson made one of the most eloquent, unequivocal, and passionate pleas for human rights ever made by a President of the United States. . . . We had the support of the President in calling for immediate relief of the problems of the disinherited people of our nation (King 1998, 288).¶ Even more skeptical civil rights activists, who had refused to acquiesce to the 1964 MFDP compromise, were moved by Johnson's fervent support of what one of his startled advisors called "radical" changes in the federal government's support of voting rights.14 SNCC President John Lewis acknowledged that on this night LBJ was "a man who spoke from his heart, a statesman, a poet."" The following week, CORE's James Farmer led a march to the White House to express civil rights activists' support for the president's efforts. "When President Johnson said 'we shall overcome' he joined the civil rights revolution," Farmer told the marchers "Now it's up to you and me to keep him in it-to keep him and our friends in Congress moving. If we let up the pressure, they let up the progress.'"5¶ Although most activists appreciated Johnson's support in achieving historic reforms, tensions within the civil rights movement threatened to sever its critical but uneasy ties with his White House. Indeed, in contrast to moderate civil rights leaders, more radical insurgents loathed White House leadership and their views increasingly gained a hold over the movement. Johnson's civil rights sermon won little praise from radical civil rights activists in Alabama like James Foreman, the field secretary for SNCC. As far as radical SNCC dissidents were concerned, Johnson's speech was little more than a "tinkling, empty symbol." As he told reporters, "Johnson spoiled a good song that day" (Lewis with D'Orso 1998, 340).¶ Social Protest and the Limits of White House Leverage¶ Toward the end of 1965, the energy and resources committed to the Great Society began to suffer, threatened by Johnson's preoccupation with the Vietnam War. The war also fatally wounded his relationship with the civil rights movement. Even moderate civil rights leaders like King became visible participants in the antiwar movement. King saw the Vietnam War not only as morally indefensible, but also as a growing commitment that would divert resources needed to address problems of poverty at home. As the schisms in the civil rights movement deepened along with the administration's involvement in Vietnam, Johnson became the target, rather than the ally, of civil rights activists.¶ In late November, White House aide Hayes Redmon lamented the antiwar efforts of civil rights activists. "I am increasingly concerned over the involvement of civil rights groups with anti-war demonstrators," he wrote in a memo to White House aide Bill Moyers. "The anti-Vietnam types are driving the middle class to the right. This is the key group that is slowly being won over to the civil rights cause. Negro leadership involvement with anti-Vietnam groups will set their programs back substantially."16 King's opposition became public in September of 1965, infuriating Johnson and exposing the inherent conflict between the interests of the president and civil rights movement. Like Kennedy, Johnson deferred to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover's use of telephone wiretaps and hotel room microphones to discredit King on national security grounds.17¶ Johnson had tried to renew ties with King a few weeks before the civil rights leader publicly voiced opposition to his administration. In August, soon after race riots broke out in Watts, he called King to express his continued support for civil rights and to question him about rumors that he opposed Johnson's Vietnam policy.1" Trying in vain to meet the demands of spiraling civil rights militancy, the president urged King to take seriously and to help publicize a recent commencement address the president had given on June 4 at Howard University (Kotz 2005, 353). The speech proclaimed that "freedom was not enough" and that the time had come to "seek . . . not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and as a result." LBJ told King that it demonstrated his administration's commitment to address the most stubborn forces sustaining racial inequality.'9 The Howard University speech was arguably the boldest rhetorical presidential challenge to racial injustice since Lincoln's second inaugural. And yet, he complained, civil rights activists had in large part greeted it with a deafening silence. Johnson also urged the civil rights leader to support the administration on Vietnam, telling King, "I want peace as much as you do if not more so," because "I'm the fellow who had to wake up to 50 marines killed."20¶ King acknowledged that Johnson's Howard University speech was "the best statement and analysis of the problem" he had seen and that "no president ever said it like that before."21 Nonetheless, King and other movement leaders refused to lavish praise publicly on the Howard University address, concerned that associating too closely with Johnson might weaken their standing in the civil rights community. As David Carter has written, "in this period of growing polarization it had become increasingly clear to civil rights leaders, and ultimately even to the President and his staff, that a White House blessing of a leader was tantamount to a curse" (2001, 320).¶ Indeed, King was the least of the administration's problems. As the civil rights movement trained its eye on the poverty-stricken ghettos of large northern cities, King lost influence to more militant leaders who were better attuned than he to the frustrations and rage of young urban blacks (Mann 1996, 480). "Black power" advocates like Stokely Carmichael, newly elected head of SNCC, and Floyd McKissick of CORE, were not only dissatisfied with the achievements of the Johnson administration's civil rights program, but they also were contemptuous of its objective of racial integration. The growing militancy of black America erupted during the summer of 1966 as urban riots swept across the nation. In the wake of these developments, the moderately conservative middle class, as the White House feared, grew impatient with reform. The administration's string of brilliant triumphs in civil rights was snapped. Its 1966 civil rights bill, an open housing proposal, fell victim to a Senate filibuster. Johnson's leadership of the civil rights movement was a great asset to him in 1964, but it was a political liability by the summer of 1966.¶ From the start of his presidency, Johnson had recognized that his alliance with the civil rights movement risked substantial Democratic losses in the South. The president's encouraging visit to Georgia gave him hope that he would be forgiven by white southerners; this was the very purpose of his appeal to conscience. But the elections of November 1966 confirmed the South was not in a forgiving mood. Three segregationist Democrats-Lester Maddox in Georgia, James Johnson in Arkansas, and George P. Mahoney in Maryland-won their party's gubernatorial nomination. In Alabama, voters ratified a caretaker administration for Lurleen Wallace, since her husband, George, was not permitted to succeed himself. George Wallace, dubbed the "prime minister" of Alabama, had by 1966 emerged as a serious threat to consummate the North-South split in the Democratic Party, either by entering the 1968 presidential primaries or running as a third party candidate. The gubernatorial race in California, where former movie star Ronald Reagan handily defeated the Democratic incumbent Edmund G. Brown, revealed that conservative insurgency was not limited to southern Democrats.¶ In the wake of the civil rights crisis of 1966, Johnson no longer met with civil rights leaders. Instead, he followed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 's advice to send a number of his younger aides to various cities to meet with young black leaders. The attorney general's suggestion was the origin of ghetto visits that White House aides made throughout 1967; a dozen or so visited troubled black areas in more than 20 major cities. On the one hand, the ghetto visits revealed the extent to which the modern presidency sought to assume important tasks once carried out by intermediary political associations like political parties. Rather than relying on local party leaders for information about their communities, Johnson asked his aides to live in various ghettos and then report directly to him about the state of black America. Local public officials and party leaders, even Chicago's powerful boss Richard Daley, were not told of the ghetto visits, lest they take umbrage at someone from the White House rooting about their home territories.¶ On the other hand, these visits marked the declining significance of the modern presidency as the leading agent of liberal reform-a symptom of its "extraordinary isolation."22 This isolation was accentuated by the evolution of the civil rights movement, whose more militant leaders, representing an oppositional culture that tended to withdraw rather than bestow legitimacy on reigning institutions, gained ascendancy in urban ghettos. The Johnson White House struggled to understand why young urban blacks, as one aide put it, "were against just about every leader (Negro and white) . . . except [black power advocates like] Stokely Carmichael."23 The awkward presence of these Johnson aides-mostly white, mostly from small towns and cities in the Midwest and Southwest-spending a week, sometimes a weekend, in volatile ghetto environments such as Harlem and Watts was, as a leading participant put it, a "unique attempt by the President to discover what was happening in urban ghettos and why."24 Aides were not sent to organize or manipulate or steer, but solely to gain a sense of the ideas, frustrations, and attitudes at the basis of the riots.¶ The ghetto reports apparently helped persuade Johnson to respond to the riots by intensifying his efforts to expand civil rights and war on poverty programs.The administration continued to push for an open-housing bill that was enacted after King's assassination. In 1968, LBJ also submitted and Congress passed the most extensive and most expensive public housing legislation in American history. Finally, Johnson continued to support the White House's Office of Economic Opportunity, even though its sponsorship of Community Action Programs (CAPs), requiring "the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and groups involved," was reportedly having a disruptive influence in many cities and was the target of bitter complaints from local party leaders. LBJ seethed privately about the "revolutionary" activity that some CAPs were fomenting, but he never repudiated them publicly and continued to support federal funds for neighborhood organizations. CAPs were the administration's final, frail hope that it could benefit from the transformative energy of a movement over which it rapidly lost influence.26¶ Political Failure and Enlightened Administration¶ **Against the general norm that presidents are repressive or indifferent in their response to the demands of insurgent groups, Johnson's uneasy collaboration with the civil rights movement shows how an ambitious president and social activists can form an alliance in the service of enduring reform**. Although this fusion of presidential power to a movement for social justice was short lived, **the fragile partnership made possible the most dramatic civil rights legislation since the Reconstruction era**. **Without the work of civil rights leaders and activists in mobilizing demonstrations that elicited the violent reaction of segregationists and aroused strong sympathy in the country, no civil rights revolution would have been possible. At the same time,** **without Johnson's willingness to support, indeed, to take advantage of the opportunity that civil rights direct action provided, the landmarks laws of 1964 and 1965 might never have been enacted.**¶ Johnson's singularly determined fusion of executive power to a social movement eventually imploded. As early as 1965, it became clear that Johnson's effort to become a leader of the civil rights movement suffered from his attempt to manage all the other responsibilities that the modern presidency pulls in its train. Since Theodore Roosevelt, reformers and ambitious presidents had endeavored to reconstruct the executive office so that its constitutional mandate to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" might be rededicated as a vantage point for social and economic change. But Johnson's explosive relationship with the civil rights movement cast serious doubt on the "Progressive era conceit that the presidency is inherently disposed to ally itself with movements for reform and liberation" (Skowronek and Glassman 2007, 7). In the end, the Great Society revealed both the untapped potential for cooperation between the modern presidency and social movements and the inherent tensions between "high office" and insurgency that made such collaboration so difficult. The tasks of the modern presidency-the domestic and international responsibilities that constrained the "steward of the public welfare"-necessarily limited the extent to which Johnson could become a trusted leader of the social movements that arose during the 1960s.¶ By 1968, Johnson, the self-fashioned agent of a political transformation as fundamental as any in history, had become a hated symbol of the status quo, forced into retirement lest he contribute further to the destruction of the liberal consensus. As he privately told Hubert Humphrey in the spring of 1968, "I could not be the rallying force to unite the country and meet the problems confronted by the nation ... in the face of a contentious campaign and the negative attitudes towards [me] of the youth, Negroes, and academics."27¶ LBJ thus saw the mantle of leadership pass to the likes of Eugene McCarthy, whose pioneering grassroots organization drove the president from the field in 1968, and George McGovern, the Democratic nominee for president in 1972. The "McGovern Democrats," who took control of the Democratic Party in the wake of the fractious 1968 presidential contest, followed the progressive tradition of scorning partisanship-of desiring a direct relationship between presidential candidates and grassroots activists. In this respect, the expansion of presidential primaries and other changes in the nomination politics initiated by the McGovern-Fraser reforms were the logical extension of the modern presidency. But these reformers, champions of a "new politics," rejected notions of popular presidential leadership that prevailed during the Progressive era and New Deal eras (Ceaser 1979; Miroff 2007). **Viewing the president as the agent rather than the steward of the public welfare, new politics liberals embraced the general ideas current in the late 1960s that social movements should direct presidential politics and governance.**¶ **Even as McGovern's insurgent presidential campaign was an electoral disaster, the legislation conceived by the ephemeral alliance between Johnson and the civil rights movement built a national administrative apparatus that had staying power in American political life**. The 1964 and 1965 civil rights reforms empowered the federal bureaucracy-especially the Department of Justice, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the newly formed EEOC-to assist the courts in creating parallel enforcement mechanisms for civil rights. These proved effective. For example, in four years the Johnson administration accomplished more desegregation in southern schools than the courts had in the previous 14.¶ As historians like Hugh Davis Graham have chronicled, "new theories of compensatory justice and group rights" given prominent expression in LBJ's Howard University Address were deftly advanced by "new social regulators" in the EEOC (Graham 1990, Chapter IX). Despite the late-1960s political demise of the Great Society, the EEOC staff, aided by supporters in other executive agencies and the federal courts, was able to expand the EEOC's power far beyond the original constraints of Title VII of the act. The text of Title VII explicitly sought to limit findings of discrimination by requiring evidence of intent. EEOC staffers argued that racial disparities in the composition of a labor force were ample proof of discrimination, whether intended or not. Seizing authority on its own accord, the EEOC collected data from tens of thousands of employers in order to analyze entire industries. Only a couple of years after Johnson left office, the federal courts deferred to EEOC guidelines, tossing aside Title VII's original dictates in favor of an "effects based definition of discrimination" that went beyond the goal of equal treatment to that of equal results (Graham 1990, 250). A "quiet revolution" had occurred in national administration, one that dismantled the compromise that Dirksen and moderate Republicans extracted in 1964.¶ Similarly, as Richard Valelly has documented, an "extended Voting Rights Act" emerged from an institutional partnership between the Justice Department and the courts. **The alliance between bureaucratic discretion and legal activism expanded the 1965 statute from the commitment to free African Americans from discriminatory practices, such as literacy tests, to a more capacious program that promoted minority office holding, regulated nonsouthern states and local jurisdictions that had discriminated against the voting rights of racial minorities, and freed regulators and plaintiffs from having to demonstrate intentional discrimination in seeking remedies for low levels of minority representation and electoral participation** (Valelly 2004, chap. 9)-**These**¶ **administrative and legal efforts appeared to give institutional form to hard-won victories achieved by Johnson and civil rights activists**. At the same time, the securing of what Valelly has called a "second reconstruction" tended to isolate civil rights activists. LBJ paid dearly for the alienation of the social movements from the White House; just as surely, ***the civil rights movement and the other social protest movements it inspired paid a price for their rejection of presidential leadership***. The 1960s unleashed new forces and new expectations that could not be quelled by the election of Nixon. Indeed, it was the 1970s rather than the 1960s when affirmative action and many other civil rights measures became a real presence in American society. **And yet, even as they continued to look to the national government to solve the problems thrown up by an industrial-and postindustrial-order, the public interest groups that emerged during the 1970s** (which evolved from the social movements of the 1960s) **distrusted presidential leadership and bureaucratic agencies, and sought to protect social policy from unfriendly executive administration** (Melnick 2005). **Teaching Americans both to expect more from the government and to trust it less, the Great Society was the fulcrum on which decline of liberalism and the rise of conservatism tilted.**¶ **Johnson's willingness to embrace the civil rights movement and its reform agenda transcended narrow, cautious self-interest. Indeed, his wholehearted support for far-reaching civil rights defied the careful distance that most presidents maintained vis-à-vis social movements**. As we shall see, Reagan and his political allies developed an alliance with Christian Conservatives that was arbitrated by a reconstructed Republican Party. Consequently, he would be much less exposed in his relationship with the Religious Right than Johnson had been in seeking to leverage the civil rights revolution.

#### We are the imperialists – and we are culpable – confronting that is a critical moment for counter-hegemonic resistance

The Center for Informed Americans NEWSLETTER #43 Revisiting September 11 The Collapsing Towers September 28, 2003, <http://davesweb.cnchost.com/nwsltr43.html>

A few months have passed since then and no evidence establishing a link between Iraq and the ‘terrorist’ attacks has surfaced. So where do we now stand? According to the most recent polls, an even higher percentage of the American people (around 70%) now believe that Saddam was behind the carnage of September 11. It is perfectly obvious that we, as a nation, are in denial. In a big way. We will believe virtually any lie (or at least convince ourselves that we believe), no matter how thoroughly that lie has been discredited, just so long as we do not have to face the undeniable reality that our beloved, peace-loving, law-abiding nation is waging a brutal, illegal, unprovoked and completely unjustified war of aggression. We refuse to deal with the reality that America is not the hero of this story, even though the evidence is overwhelming. What that evidence says is that we are the aggressors. We are the imperialists. We are the oppressors. We are the occupiers. We are the mass murderers. We are the war criminals. But to the vast majority of us, that cannot possibly be true. We are (repeat after me) America, land of the free and home of the brave. We do not invade and occupy sovereign nations for the express purpose of exploiting their resources and oppressing their people. We do not slaughter innocents for the financial gain of the Washington elite. There must, therefore, be a righteous reason that we invaded Iraq -- and we are determined to find it. We need to find it, and then cling to it for dear life, no matter how demonstrably fraudulent it is. During the build-up to the invasion, we were willing to accept the most amateurishly fabricated evidence of the existence of ‘weapons of mass destruction.’ We would have gratefully welcomed any discovery of such weapons, no matter how obviously staged the 'discovery' would have been. Even without any ‘discoveries,’ even after months of searching, many of us are reluctant to give up our belief in the mythical weapons. We will continue to believe in nonexistent weapons just as we will continue to believe that most of the Iraqi people are really quite happy to have their country militarily occupied. And we will continue to believe that occupying Iraq somehow makes America a better and safer place to live, just as we will continue to believe that the world becomes a much kinder and gentler place every time America slaughters for profit. Most of all, we will continue to believe that Iraq sponsored the September 11 attacks, because that belief allows us to construct a false reality in which America did not, in defiance of world opinion, choose to wage an unprovoked war against a nation that posed no threat to anyone. No, in our artificial reality, a benevolent America acted in self-defense against a terrorist-sponsoring regime that had launched a completely unprovoked first-strike against us. We will believe - indeed, we will warmly embrace - that Orwellian inversion of reality because we lack the courage to take even a cursory look at the alternative. We would rather live in a parallel universe than accept a reality that can no longer be reasonably denied, but which we are terrified to confront.

***Emphasizing policy relevance checks multiple existential threats***

**Walt ’05**, Stephen M. Walt, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, THERELATIONSHIPBETWEEN THEORY AND¶ POLICY IN INTERNATIONALRELATIONS,¶ doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904, <http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol272/Walt.theory.pdf>, jj

**The need for powerful theories that could help policy makers design effective**¶ **solutions would seem to be apparent as well. The unexpected emergence of a**¶ **unipolar world, the rapid expansion of global trade and ﬁnance, the challenges**¶ **posed by failed states and global terrorism, the evolving human rights agenda**,¶ **the spread of democracy, concerns about the global environment, the growing**¶ **prominence of nongovernmental organizations**, etc., **present policy makers with problems that cry out for new ideas**. **These phenomena**—and many others—**have**¶ **all been objects of sustained scholarly inquiry, and** **one might expect policy makers**¶ **to consume the results with eagerness and appreciation**.¶ **Yet despite the need for well-informed advice about contemporary international**¶ **problems, and the energy and activity being devoted to studying these questions**,¶ **there has long been dissatisfaction with the contributions of IR theorists** (Morgenthau 1958, Tanter & Ullman 1972). According to former diplomat David Newsom, “**much of today’s scholarship** [on international issues] **is either irrelevant or**¶ **inaccessible to policymakers...much remains locked within the circle of esoteric**¶ **scholarly discussion**” (Newsom 1995–1996, p. 66). Another observer declares that¶ “the higher learning about international relations does not loom large on the intellectual landscape. Its practitioners are not only rightly ignored by practicing¶ foreign policy ofﬁcials; they are usually held in disdain by their fellow academics¶ as well” (Kurth 1998, p. 29). The veteran U.S. statesman Paul Nitze described theory and practice as “harmonic aspects of one whole,” but he believed that “most¶ of what has been written and taught under the heading of ‘political science’ by¶ Americans since World War II...has also been of limited value, if not counterproductive as a guide to the conduct of actual policy” (Nitze 1993, p. 15). Similarly,¶ George (2000) reports that policy makers’ eyes “would glaze as soon as I used the¶ word theory.” Nor is the problem unique to the United States, as indicated by the¶ Chief Inspector of the British diplomatic service’s comment that he was “not sure¶ what the academic discipline of IR—if indeed there be such a thing as an academic¶ discipline of IR—has to contribute to the practical day-to-day work of making and¶ managing foreign policy” (Wallace 1994).

***\*That’s specifically true of presidential powers --- effective presidential scholarship key to address a litany of issues***

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**Presidential power is increasingly intertwined with the most basic and dire challenges of American governance and political economy**. ***The study of the presidency has rarely been more important***; **its repertoire of theory and methods positions scholars to take on the challenge**.

**Contention 3: Solvency**

***Requiring prior congressional approval of conflict is vital to revitalizing democratic accountability – it fosters deliberation that breaks down group-think and ensures better decision-making and challenges presidential supremacy***

**Martin ’11**, Craig Martin, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law, Winter, 2011¶ Brooklyn Law Review¶ 76 Brooklyn L. Rev. 611, ARTICLE: Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force in Compliance with In-ternational Law, Lexis, jj

Turning to the second element of the Model--the provision that would require legislative approval of decisions to use force--there is of course considerable theoretical support for such a constitutional structure. As we have already discussed, the concept dates back at least to the development of the American Articles of Confederation, and the war powers provisions of the U.S. Constitution continues to be a model of the principle. It is also one of the central issues in the war powers debate that has been raging in the United States for over a hundred years. But much of the modern debate in the United States is over the precise meaning and exact scope of the war powers provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and the particulars of many of those arguments need not concern us [\*680] here. n257 As we have already reviewed, however, **the primary motive of many of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, as expressed most clearly by Madison, was to reduce the likelihood of war**. n258 **And the theoretical arguments of Madison, Kant, and others in support of such a separation of powers related to both the domestic objectives of the state: putting an important check on the state's rush to war and increasing the democratic accountability of the process of deciding on war; and the broader goals of reducing the incidence of war generally in the international system**. In this sense, the arguments in support of this element of the Model again relate to the causes of war at both the domestic level and the international level.

The starting point is the insight that **requiring legislative approval of executive decision making on the use of force will likely reduce the risk of rash decisions to go to war for the wrong reasons**. This argument was initially advanced by Madison and Kant, among others, and indeed can be traced all the way back to Thucydides. n259 Madison and John Jay both argued **that the executive is more likely to be motivated by parochial self-interest and narrow perspectives, and thus more likely to enter into armed conflict than the legislature**. n260 Madison further argued that there ought to be a separation between those who are charged with the conduct of war, as the President is as the Commander in Chief, and those who have the authority to decide on the commencement of war. n261 But **the argument becomes more compelling when unpacked and explained in a little more detail, with the support of more modern theory. We need to explore the question of how exactly the legislative involvement improves decision making or** [\*681] **engages the causes of war in a manner that would reduce the incidence of war.**

It is helpful to begin by recalling the functions of legislatures. n262 In addition to passing legislation, **the legislature in virtually all liberal democracies**, whether parliamentary or presidential in structure, **performs the core functions of representation, oversight, and control over government expenditure.** n263 **Representation and oversight in particular are important to the argued benefit of legislative involvement in the decision to use force**. **Both functions are tied to the core notions of democratic accountability and to deliberative democracy, which overlap in important ways**. **Democratic accountability is understood to include the idea that the people who are likely to be impacted by decisions ought to be able to participate in the decision making. Participation in this sense means not only having some expectation that the collective will of constituents will be taken into consideration in the decision-making process, but that the public debate and deliberation that is part of the parliamentary process of decision making will also serve the vital function of informing constituents and affording them some sense of access to the decision-making process**. n264

**Obviously, this process of debate and information exchange is also at the heart of ideas of deliberative democracy**. The perspective here, though, is not so much on the importance of making the process accountable to and representative of the people, but on the extent to which the **very process of deliberation among the representatives of disparate stake-holders and interests will result in the generation of sounder judgments**. **The argument is that the process results in better decisions due to the attenuation of extreme positions, the canvassing of a wider range of perspectives and sources of information, and the vigorous public interrogation of reasons** [\*682] **and motives underlying proposals**. n265 More specifically, theories of deliberative democracy hold that **the deliberative process**, of which the parliamentary debate and decision-making process is a key feature, **actually involves the transformation of preferences through the consideration of the justifications offered by various perspectives, rather than merely serving as a means by which society can aggregate preferences**. n266

**The oversight function of legislatures also feeds into both these aspects of democracy, in that the employment of specialized committees to engage in public inquiries into policy choices or proposed courses of action, provides a deeper level of deliberation that ensures a more thorough interrogation of policy justifications and the underlying information upon which policy proposals are based**. **Senate committee hearings during the Vietnam War illustrate how such oversight can reveal important information underlying policy debates, which in turn can influence public opinion and better inform the policy preferences of the representatives of the people**. In 1967, the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the escalation of the strategic bombing of North Vietnam. After the representatives of the Joint Chiefs, and in particular the Chief of the Air Force, had testified before the committee on the necessity of the continued strategic bombing, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stunned the committee, the government, and the public by testifying that the bombing was entirely ineffective. n267

**The performance of these functions of the legislature, to the extent that they are permitted or required to operate in the decision-making process on the use of force, engage the domestic causes of war in important ways**. The fuller realization of the representative and oversight functions--serving as they do to both incorporate the will of the broader population and to arguably contribute to the arrival at sounder judgments through the deliberative process--would result in those structural aspects of democratic states that comprise the Image II factors most related to the causes of the "democratic [\*683] peace," being brought to bear more directly on the decision-making process. In other words, the structure would thus more perfectly reflect the theoretical ideal that is part of the structural explanations of the democratic peace. n268

**The institutional structure of the decision-making process created by the Model's separation of powers element would also affect the political costs of going to war** in a manner that would further engage the Image II causes of war. **Absent an overwhelming or obvious threat, the procedural requirements to obtain the support of the majority of the legislature would impose significant political costs upon the executive**. n269 The structure would effectively create a sliding scale, in the sense that **the greater the threat or the more obvious the case for war--such as the use of force in self-defense against an ongoing armed attack--the lower the costs would be in obtaining legislative approval**. Converse-ly, **the more tenuous the case for engaging in armed conflict, the more** [\*684] **politically costly it would be to win over the majority of the legislature for support.** This is precisely the kind of structural characteristic that reduces the Image II causes of war.

**The second element of the Model would also engage the** Image I **causes of war, which include particular psycho-logical traits that are common in many executive officers, systemic problems of misperception among decision makers, and the irrational behavior of small-group decision making reflected in "groupthink" and the "bureaucratic politics model" of decision making**. n270 **The risks that such tendencies could lead to irrational or suboptimal decisions to use armed force would be reduced, in the case of each of these particular phenomenon, by spreading the decision-making process more widely through the inclusion of the legislative body**. **The requirement to obtain legislative approval, bringing to bear the core functions of deliberative democracy on the decision-making process, such that a wider set of perspectives and criteria are brought to the process, as well as a more public interrogation of reasons and rationales, would significantly reduce the potential for these potential features of government decision making to manifest themselves in the form of unsound or dangerous decisions regarding the use of force.** n271

***Redefining hostilities in the WPR boosts congressional involvement, checks intervention, and stops circumvention***

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**Congress should strengthen the WPR regime by defining hostilities in a manner that links hostilities to the scope and intensity of a use of force, irrespective of the attendant threat of U.S. casualties**. **Without defining hostilities, Con-gress has ceded to the President the ability to evade the trigger and the limits of the WPR**. **The President's adoption of a definition of hostilities that is tied to the threat of U.S. casualties or the presence of U.S. ground troops opens the door to long-lasting and potentially intensive operations that rely on drones** - at least beyond the sixty-day window - **that escape the WPR by virtue of drones being pilotless** (which is to say, by virtue of drones being drones). **Tying hostilities to the intensity and scope of the use of force will limit the President's ability to evade Congressional regulation of war**. **It will curtail future instances of the United States being in an armed conflict for purposes of international law but not for purposes of domestic law, as was the case in Libya**. Finally, ***a statutory definition of hostilities will provide the judiciary with a meaningful standard for determining presidential compliance with the WPR*** - assuming the future existence of a plaintiff able to surmount the various prudential doctrines that have counseled against entertaining WPR cases thus far.

***The distinction between “declaration of war” and “authorization of war” is important***

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I’m not sure that this is resonating with those that are unfamiliar with what a declaration of war means. **For most** people, **the declaration of war is a formality whereby the president makes sure that it is agreeable to the Congress that he utilizes the military**. Some might even go so far as to say it is the president “asking permission” from the Congress to do so. **By this reasoning, both** Presidents **Bush and Obama have complied**, especially considering H.J. Res. 114 (October 16, 2002). With that resolution, Congress authorized the president to use military force in the war on terror. **What is the difference between that and a declaration of war?** **The answer is both intuitive and supported by history.** **First, a “declaration” has nothing to do with “permission.”** **Neither is it the same thing as creation or initiation**. **One can only declare something that already exists.** Therefore**, a declaration of war does not create a war or initiate a war. A declaration of war is a resolution passed by Congress recognizing that the United States is already at war.**

***Redefining “hostilities” as “armed attack” solves***

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A. A Process-Based Constitutional Incorporation of Jus ad Bellum The article begins with the incorporation of the principles of jus ad bellum. The first section provides: (1) **Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed attack in international law, shall be made only after sufficient and demonstrable consideration of whether the proposed action is consistent with the applicable principles of international law relating to the use of armed force, as found in the United Nations Charter, other relevant treaties to which the State is a party, and the related principles of customary international law. The key elements of this section**, which require some further discussion and explanation, **are that**: (i) it incorpo-rates both conventional international law (that is, treaty law) and customary international law; (ii) it specifies the regime of law from which the principles are drawn, with reference by name to the most important governing convention (the U.N. Charter); (iii) it incorporates the relevant principles of international law by reference only, rather than explicitly stipulating the substance of those principles; (iv) it is process based rather than substantive, in the sense that it does not purport to incorporate and impose the actual prohibitions from international law, but rather it only creates an obligation for decision makers to sufficiently consider compliance with those prohibitions (and the exceptions thereto); and finally, (v) **it provides a threshold level of force that would trigger the operation of the provision, with some criteria for defining that trigger**. Beginning with the first element, there are a number of reasons underlying the decision to incorporate both treaty and customary international law. There is a wide range of approaches among constitutional democracies regarding the manner in which international law is treated within their domestic legal systems, and great variation in the extent to which there is already some constitutional provision for such treatment. This not only relates to the classic theoretical division between monist and dualist perspectives, but also relates, in practical terms, to the significant differences among [\*706] states regarding how the different forms of international law are received and the status each is af-forded within the domestic legal system. n330 The mechanisms and processes by which states incorporate (or transform, as the case may be) customary international law are typically different than those used for the incorporation of conventional international law, and many states also afford one a higher status within the domestic legal system than the other. Moreover, these differences themselves vary considerably across states, even among liberal democracies, with some such as the Netherlands placing a primacy on treaty law, n331 while others such as Germany, Austria, and Italy giving customary international law higher status. n332 States vary as well on how each of these is to be received by the domestic legal systems. n333 All of this suggests a couple of inferences. First, there are clear examples of constitutional democracies incorpo-rating within their constitutions both conventional international law and customary international law, and indeed examples of each being afforded a higher status than domestic statutes and even a national constitution. Second, given the very uneven treatment among democracies for the purposes of developing a universal model of incorporation, and given that there are principles from both a treaty and custom that are thought to be [\*707] important, the incorporation mechanism should explicitly incorporate the principles of both systems as part of the Model. That way, regardless of the more general approach within the particular constitutional system, the provision would make quite clear that the principles of both systems are being incorporated directly into the constitution for the purposes of this constraint on the use of armed force. This of course raises the question of whether there are significant differences between the principles of jus ad bel-lum to be found in conventional international law and custom. There is in fact very little difference, as the International Court of Justice went to some pains to establish in Nicaragua v. United States (Merits). n334 And the most fundamental principles of the jus ad bellum regime, the incorporation of which is central to the Model, are essentially found in Article 2(4) and Chapter VII (which includes Article 51) of the U.N. Charter. Nonetheless, it will be recalled that one of the theoretical arguments in support of adopting the Model to begin with is that the jus ad bellum regime is coming under pressure to change, leading to the possible development of new principles and new legal tests to determine their application. The extent to which there is indeed some change to the jus ad bellum regime in the near to mid-term, it is unlikely to come in the form of amendments to the U.N. Charter or the adoption of any new treaty. It is much more likely to come in the form of changes to customary international law. In such circumstances, it will be important that the Model will have been structured so as to incorporate the relevant principles of customary international law, and to require that the decision making on the use of armed force be informed by the most current developments in the law. The second element of this subsection of the provision is the manner in which it refers specifically to the principles of the jus ad bellum regime, and refers even more explicitly to a particular treaty regime, namely the U.N. Charter. This is in contrast to the option of a much broader incorporation of international law as a whole, as many national con-stitutions already have. Some of the reasons for a more narrow and specific incorporation will be obvious and were discussed earlier. n335 In addition, given fairly widespread concerns about [\*708] the legitimacy in permitting interna-tional law to trump domestic law--concerns grounded in arguments about the democratic deficiency of the international law-making process, the erosion of national sovereignty, and the negating of the democratic will of the state's citizenry--it may be considerably easier in practical terms to mobilize support for a carefully tailored provision than a blanket incorporation of international law along the lines of the Netherlands. In addition to this, however, the incorporation of specific principles or regimes of international law provides a much more fertile basis for the internal interpretation and internalization of the associated norms, which as was dis-cussed earlier is an important aspect of the process of enhancing compliance with international law according to trans-national legal process theory. Moreover, by identifying particular regimes and specifying the precise treaty from which principles are drawn, examples from a number of countries suggest that the constitutional provision will thereby create the legitimate basis for courts and other domestic institutions to consider how those principles have been interpreted by international tribunals and organizations. This can be an important factor in insuring that the principles that are incor-porated remain organically connected to the international law sources from which they were drawn. One of the best examples of this approach is the constitutional incorporation of human rights principles by a number of countries over the last few decades. For instance, Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides that "the norms relative to basic human rights and liberties which are recognized by the constitution, shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain." n336 This has been interpreted to mean that such human rights conventions as the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights n337 have constitutional status within the Spanish legal system; or, to put it another way, the relevant provisions of those conventions have effectively been incorporated by reference into the [\*709] Constitution. n338 What is more, this incorporation by explicit reference to the conventions themselves has provided a basis for the Spanish courts to not only interpret the constitutional provisions in light of the principles in the conventions, but also to draw upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the conventions by international courts and other interpretative bodies. n339 The third element of this subsection of the Model relates to the manner in which the provision incorporates the principles of jus ad bellum by reference only, rather than specifying the content of those principles as part of the consti-tutional text. In other words, **the provision requires decision makers to consider the applicable principles relating to the use of force, as found in the U.N. Charter and other sources,** but it does not provide an explicit list of what those princi-ples are. An alternative approach would have been to provide a set of subsections detailing the content of each principle and rule taken from international law that decision makers had to consider before taking action. Aside from the sheer awkwardness of trying to stipulate all the relevant rules and principles, the reasons for employing the "by reference" mechanism are similar to those discussed above in relation to the importance of including general references to customary international law and treaty sources. That is, **incorporation by reference preserves the flexibility of the Model, such that the provision can essentially evolve as the underlying international law principles change over time, and it retains the organic link to those principles for purposes of interpretation**. As already discussed, that has its own inherent risks, but given the likelihood that the jus ad bellum regime will develop over the next few decades, coupled with the difficulty associated with any constitutional amendment, building in that kind of flexibility is important. An example of this approach, albeit in a regular statute rather than a constitutional context, can be found in the Alien Tort Statute in the United States, the key clause of which states that "the district courts shall have original juris-diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of [\*710] the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." n340 This does not incorporate international law norms per se, but as the Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute confers subject matter jurisdiction and creates a cause of action for the violation of the "laws of nations," which is a reference to customary international law. n341 Two advantages of the incorporation by reference are well illustrated by this example. The first is the flexibility of the legislative provision, as its content can essentially evolve over time without requiring any change to statutory lan-guage. Thus, in Sosa it was recognized that the content of the "narrow set of violations of the law of nations" today is certainly not the same as the narrow set of violations that were contemplated back in 1789 when the statute was enacted. Rather, the range of what types of violations within the law of nations was defined, but the content of those violations was not specified, and is left to be ascertained according to the current principles of customary international law. n342 Second, but very much related, is the advantage of maintaining an organic connection to the international law principles, which thus continue to be the living source of the rules. The employment of the term "in violation of the laws of nations" constituted an intermediary within the statute, or a trigger, for the application of the primary norms that are promulgated in detail somewhere else--in this instance in the sources of the laws of nations. In the sense of Hart's pri-mary and secondary rules, therefore, the reference in the statute is merely a secondary norm, and leaves the primary norm as the source of the content. n343 [\*711] As explained earlier, this retention of an organic connection with the underlying international law principles also ensures that there will be full access to the associated interpretations and understanding of those principles, including the decisions of international tribunals and organizations, as they have developed over time. This relationship tends to be lost when the contemporary understanding of customary international law rules is taken or the language of a rule is lifted from some treaty and then dropped into the text of a constitution (often in some slightly revised form). Moreover, the juxtaposition of the revised language with other provisions, severed as it is from its conceptual source, can lead to significant unintended consequences. n344 The fourth element of the subsection is that it is process-based rather than substantive in nature. In other words, the provision does not incorporate the prohibitions (and corresponding exceptions) of the jus ad bellum regime as sub-stantive clauses in the Constitution. Rather, it merely requires that the decision makers contemplating the use of force sufficiently and demonstrably consider whether the proposed action is consistent with the international law principles that have been incorporated. There are several reasons for choosing to develop the mechanism in this fashion, but they largely relate to the practical issues of implementation. It can be anticipated that there would be significant political objection in many jurisdictions to any contemplated adoption of this Model. The foundation of many of these objections, principled and otherwise, would be a resistance to the idea of incorporating international law principles to bind the hands of government on issues of national security--issues relating to self-preservation and defending "vital interests." As has already been suggested above, the arguments behind many of these objections are misplaced. But the fact remains that if the Model proposed the incorporation of the principles as binding constitutional prohibitions, which would also entail conferring upon the judiciary the power to decide whether a proposed use of force did or did not comply with the exceptions to the prohibition as a matter of both constitutional and international [\*712] law, then the volume of these objections would likely be overwhelming. Such implementation of binding prohibitions may be possible and desirable in the future, but for now a process-based model may serve as an initial and more viable step along the road to that objective. And for the reasons already discussed in the previous Part, a process-based provision will still have a significant effect. **The final element in the subsection is the initial gate-keeping mechanism, which limits the application of the pro-vision to only those decisions regarding the use of armed force that could constitute an "armed attack," as that term is understood in international law**. **This is to ensure that there is a de minimis level below which the government would not be bound by the provision.** Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, the same trigger would apply to the other elements of the Model, thus ensuring that the various elements of the Model operate in harmony, and the domestic elements are triggered by criteria that are consistent with valid concepts in international law. **The parameters of this threshold test are not novel**. As explained briefly in the discussion of the modern system of jus ad bellum, **the occurrence of an armed attack is a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of self-defense (or, for the exercise of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, that an armed attack is imminent, in the sense that it is irrevocably in motion**). n345 Similarly, **the current understanding in international law is that the use of force against a state must reach a certain level--or be of "sufficient gravity**," **to use the language of the U.N. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression--before it can be considered an act of aggression**. n346 **The I**nternational **C**ourt of **J**ustice **has adopted this language in holding that the use of armed force must rise to a certain level before it constitutes an "armed attack" justifying the exercise of the right of self-defense, and it is clearly well above the mere use of force that would violate the prohibition in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter**. n347 **Where that line is actually drawn, or what criteria are to be used to determine exactly where to draw the line, has not yet been clearly established in international law, but the principle itself has been. It is no** [\*713] **more uncertain or incapable of determination than any number of other constitutional principles**. **Dinstein suggests that an armed attack requires that the use of force must be of a magnitude that is likely to "produce serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable destruction of property**." n348 **The trigger mechanisms in current constitutions, in legislation such as the War Powers Act, and proposed legisla-tion such as that in the War Powers Commission Report, are not any clearer, and what is more, they often employ terms that are not related to known and valid concepts in international law**. We have already seen that the constitutions of many countries, including that of the United States, require legislative approval of any "declaration of war." While declarations of war continue to be theoretically part of the international law on the use of force, they are no longer reflected in state practice, and are certainly no longer considered necessary to trigger the operation of the laws of war or bring into existence the legal state of war. n349 To the extent the term is interpreted to mean anything other than a formal declaration that triggers a technical state of war, it becomes highly ambiguous, as the war powers debate in the United States illustrates. **The War Powers Act lowered the threshold significantly, using as the trigger "any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced: . . . into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances**." n350 **There is no definition of "hostilities," and so there is no indication of what scale, intensity, or duration of armed conflict that would be required to constitute "hostilities" for the purpose of the provision**. **It could arguably encompass peace-keeping operations, or the lowest-level border skirmishes, yet could potentially be interpreted to exclude such uses of force as cruise missile strikes on foreign targets.** The proposed legislation of the War Powers Commission Report, in contrast, tries to raise the threshold by requir-ing a "significant armed conflict" as a condition precedent, which is defined as being "any combat operation by U.S. armed forces [\*714] lasting more than a week or expected by the president to last more than a week." It explicitly excludes a number of activities, such as "limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that sponsor terrorism," "covert operations," and "missions to protect or rescue American citizens or military or diplomatic personnel abroad." n351 Again, "combat operation" remains undefined, creating uncertainty as to what precisely is contemplated. More sig-nificantly, not only does this formulation similarly employ concepts for the trigger that do not equate with the principles of jus ad bellum, but the provision also explicitly endorses unilateral executive action for purposes that could very well violate the prohibition on the use of force in international law. Reprisals, as the term is understood in international law, are illegal. n352 Covert ops and missions to protect nationals abroad would easily encompass the support provided to the Contras in Nicaragua, and the invasions of Grenada and Panama, all actions that are widely seen as having been unlawful. n353 Moreover, aside from the explicit exceptions, the threshold would not be crossed by such uses of force as extensive missile or air strikes, including strikes with nuclear weapons, so long as they would not be expected to lead to "combat" lasting more than one week. There is little apparent relationship between the requirements of international law and that which the War Powers Commission Report considered important enough to require Congressional involvement. **The trigger that is contemplated in the Model**, while it admittedly contains some uncertainty as to its precise scope, **is a concept understood in international law.** **By employing it in the Model, we ensure that the same criterion is used for both requiring consideration of international legality and for obligating the government to obtain legislative approval, and that the criterion itself is comprised of concepts taken from international law**. **It is the kind of principle that courts are in any event well accustomed to working with, and it is necessary to have some threshold to ensure that the government is able to act more freely in circumstances that would not implicate the jus ad bellum regime in interna-tional law. It is only the use** [\*715] **of force constituting an armed attack, whether legally justified or not, which is likely to escalate into an armed conflict. Armed attack, therefore, is arguably the appropriate level of force to trigger the requirement to involve the other branches of government and focus consideration on the questions of whether that use of force will comply with international law**. n354 **A final word should be said about whether the trigger makes any distinction between the use of force for individu-al self-defense and that used for other purposes, be it collective self-defense or collective security operations**. **Constitu-tional controls of some countries do make such a distinction**, as discussed in Part III. The Constitution of Denmark, for instance, provides that "except for purposes of defence against an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King shall not use military force against any foreign state without the consent of the Parliament." n355 This clearly limits the exception to the exercise of individual self-defense. **The trigger as it is employed in both this element of the Model** and in the separation of powers element to be dis-cussed next, **makes no such distinction**. **In this element, the whole point is to force the decision makers to consider whether the proposed action complies with the principles of jus ad bellum--that is, to determine whether it falls within the scope of either self-defense, individual or collective, or collective security operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council** (to state the current exceptions on the prohibition on the use of force). **It would simply beg the question to suggest that they could avoid such a requirement in the event that the contemplated use of force was to be an exercise of self-defense. Whether it is legally a case justifying self-defense is the very thing to be determined by considering compliance with international law principles. In the context of the next element of the Model, the requirement to obtain approval of the legislature, the trigger would serve the same function. Permitting the government to avoid obtaining legislative approval in the event the force is to be used for self-defense would simply create further incentives** [\*716] **for the government to manipulate the record to provide support for a claim that the action is in fact an exercise of self-defense. It would thereby defeat the very objective of having such assertions subjected to inquiry and debate in the legislature. If the case is obvious and pressing, the analysis will be easy and the approval from the legislature quickly forthcoming; if it is not easy, than there is all the more reason for having the legislature involved in the deliberations, with all the advantages that such delibera-tion brings to the exercise. In the event of an invasion or the like, there is an emergency exception**, as will be discussed in the next section. B. Separation of Powers: Legislative Approval and Judicial Review **The second element of the Model would require legislative approval of any decision to use force**, while the third element would explicitly confer jurisdiction and establish standing for judicial review of the decision-making process. Together they form the "separation of powers" component of the Model, and as such they will be considered together here. The two provisions would read as follows, allowing, of course, for the necessary changes to conform to the cir-cumstances of each jurisdiction: 2. (i) **Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed attack in international law, shall be approved by both houses of the legislature by a simple majority of votes cast.** (ii) **In the event of an armed attack against the territory or armed forces of the state, or other such national security emergency requiring the urgent use of armed force, making prior approval from the legislature impractical, the government may use armed force without prior approval, but shall immediately provide notice of such determination to the legislature, and it shall obtain approval from each house of the legislature in accordance with the terms of subsection (i) above within 14 days of providing such notice, failing which the executive shall cease any such use of armed force.** (iii) **The approval of any use of force by the legislature in accordance with subsections (i) and (ii) above shall also constitute a decision to use force, subject to the requirements of Section 1 above.** 3. (i) Any person may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain a declaration, injunctive relief, or dam-ages, or any other remedy that the Court may consider just and appropriate in the circumstances, for any violation of this Article. [\*717] (ii) Any person who has made application under subsection 3(i) above shall have standing so long as the issue raised is a serious issue to be tried, the person has a genuine interest in the issue, even if only as a representative of the general public, and there would be no other reasonable or effective means for the issue to be brought before the Court. Again, a number of the elements of these two sections require further explanation, namely, (i) the terms of the re-quirement for legislative approval of the use of armed force; (ii) the trigger for the provision, being the same de minimis level that was provided for in the first section of the Model; (iii) the emergency exception and ex post approval re-quirement; (iv) the fact that the approval of the legislature is a "decision to use force," thus triggering the application of the requirements of Section 1 of the same Article; (v) the provision of specific jurisdiction for judicial review, and the remedies provided for; and (vi) the creation of broad standing for applications for judicial review. The first element, legislative approval for the use of armed force, is obviously an explicit move away from a "dec-laration of war," and it does not even require that the approval be in the form of a law. But it does require "approval," expressed through a formal vote. This is in contrast to the "consultation" that is contemplated by the draft legislation proposed in the War Powers Commission Report. n356 **As discussed earlier, legislatures may have natural tendencies to avoid making difficult decisions in these kinds of situations, but that is precisely why the Model should require the ex-ecutive to work to obtain the legislature's approval**. At the same time, while in some jurisdictions such approval requires supermajorities of some form, a simple majority of votes cast should be sufficient for the purposes of a general model, albeit in both houses if the system consists of a bicameral [\*718] legislature. n357 **The requirement to obtain a majority vote in each house should be sufficient to engage the deliberative and representational features of the parliamentary process in a manner that will have an impact on the operation of the domestic causes of war**. The second element is the employment of the same trigger or threshold level of force as was used in the first sec-tion of the Article. The reasons for employing this particular concept as the threshold has already been discussed at some length in the explanation of Section 1 so will not be repeated here. **It is perhaps helpful to emphasize yet again, however, how important it is to use a concept that has real meaning in international law for the purposes of triggering the involvement of the legislature in the decision to use armed force**. n358 **Even if a provision providing for the separation of powers with respect to the use of force does not have as one of its objectives an increased compliance with international law, the principles of jus ad bellum would naturally serve as a good proxy for the kinds of armed force that are likely to both escalate conflict and attract international censure. The trigger employed in this Model is taken directly from international law, based on precisely the kind of action that is most likely to lead to wider armed conflict, which are exactly the types of action that should be subject to legislative deliberation and oversight. Moreover, it still provides the executive with significant scope for limited use of force that falls below that threshold. The third element is the emergency carve out**. As mentioned earlier, **this too is not a novel concept, and various forms of such an emergency exception with ex post approval requirements can be found in a number of constitutions, though more frequently with respect to the power to declare emergencies and thus trigger emergency powers domesti-cally**. An early example of such a mechanism can be seen in the [\*719] Constitution of France of 1791. n359 **A varia-tion on this form of emergency carve-out is also the cause of much of the controversy regarding the structure and operation of the U.S. War Powers Act of 1973. Upon closer inspection, however, the War Powers Act provisions in question are not so much an emergency carve out as the grant of a carte blanche for up to ninety days, followed by an effective legislative veto of further action if Congress does not move to approve the operation. n360 That is very different from what is contemplated by the Model.** Many of the criticisms of the War Powers Act may be quite valid, but they ought not to be extended to constitu-tional provisions that require the executive to obtain legislative approval, and which include an automatic termination mechanism in the event that approval is not obtained within a specified period following an emergency use of force. Precisely because the provision is constitutional rather than statutory, the legislature would be less able to shirk its obli-gations to take up the issue when approval is sought by the executive. And requiring the executive to overcome the difficulty of mobilizing support within the legislature is a key element of the Model. That it is difficult and costly is not a basis for criticism, but one of the virtues of the structure. If the executive cannot galvanize the legislature to approve the use of force by a simple majority, particularly where the use of force has already been undertaken in what are al-leged to be urgent circumstances, then that by itself ought to raise significant questions about both the necessity and legitimacy of the use of force in question. The fourth element of this subsection of the article specifies that any approval to use force enacted by the legisla-ture constitutes a "decision to use force" as contemplated by the provisions of section 1 of the article, thus being subject to the requirements of that section. This means that **the legislature** too, in **deliberating on the question of whether or not to approve the use of force, must sufficiently and demonstrably consider whether the use of force in question is in com-pliance with the relevant prevailing principles of international law**. This is key to the combined operation of the distinct elements of the Model, as **it is the mechanism through which the Model effectively causes the deliberative functions of** [\*720] the **legislature to engage the issues of international law compliance, and which causes the criteria of legitimacy under international law to be integrated into the deliberative process of the legislature**. **It is only by requiring both branches of government to grapple with the question of compliance with international law that the Model can ensure that this perspective will be brought to bear in a meaningful and serious fashion in the decision-making process, and that over time the international law norms will be internalized and subsequently exercise influence, in the manner contemplated by transnational process theory and the ideational strand of the liberal theories of international law compliance.**

***Statutory restrictions work – they raise the political cost of executive circumvention***

Morris S. **Ogul 96**, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, is the author of several articles on legislative oversight, and coauthor (with William J. Keefe) of The American Legislative Process (9th ed., 1997). Reviews in American History 24.3 (1996) 524-527, “The Politics of the War Powers” Louis Fisher. Presidential War Powers . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xvi + 206 pp. Appendixes, bibliography, and index. $29.95., Project Muse, online, jj

In part, **these two positions can be reconciled. Recognition that presidents under specific political circumstances will in essence act unilaterally does not mean sustained tyranny is upon us**. **If congressional majorities and large segments of the public respond vigorously and negatively to specific presidential actions, political pressures will minimize the duration and impact of such actions**. Conversely if Congress and large segments of the public go along with the president, formal legal restrictions will have few decisive effects.¶ Over twenty years of experience with the War Powers Resolution (WPR) illuminates the problem. Presidents have usually claimed that they have consulted with Congress as stipulated in the WPR before committing troops to hostile zones. Few members of Congress would read the evidence that way. Presidents have notified Congress about what they were about to do while asserting that they have consulted Congress. What presidents have actually done does not conform with any normal meaning of consultation. Similarly, most presidential decisions to send troops into environments where combat is likely were reported, as required by the WPR , to the Congress. But presidents have studiously avoided reporting in the manner prescribed by the WPR, one that triggers its sixty-day cut-off provisions. [End Page 527]¶ This behavior by presidents surely leaves some critical decisions in a legal limbo. That, for good or evil, is where they actually are. What we can do is recognize that fact and act accordingly. Politics has and will govern the resolution of this issue. Whether this is desirable in principle can be debated. The realities of politics, however, have and are likely to prevail.¶ Legal restrictions sometimes cannot withstand political tides. Constitutional, limited government is not intended to work that way but it does in reality. There are few effective legal safeguards against intense and enduring political tides. Fortunately in U.S. history, such episodes have been few and relatively fleeting. **Legal restrictions** such as those specified in the War Powers Resolution have little direct, conclusive impact. They do, however, **help raise the political costs of unilateral executive actions**. **Therein lies their primary value**. Will presidents fully and freely involve Congress in decision making to send U.S. armed forces into potential or actual combat? Despite the force of Louis Fisher's account of the constitutional history of the war powers, the answer is probably not. **Will presidents carefully calculate the political costs of such initiatives? They usually will.** **Legislation designed to raise political costs may be a useful way to promote this possibility**, but Fisher places far too much weight on "solid statutory checks" (p. 205).

***Even if Congress fails --- plan triggers Court action***

**Cowan ’04**, Kelly L. Cowan, Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Economics, University of Colorado., 2004¶ Santa Clara Law Review¶ 45 Santa Clara L. Rev. 99, COMMENT: RETHINKING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A STRENGTHENED CHECK ON UNFETTERED PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING ABROAD, Lexis, jj

**Finally, the War Powers Resolution can become more effective if the judiciary is able to better interpret specific provisions of the statute**. n227 **Future cases must be brought by plaintiffs in such a way as to avoid dismissal on justiciable grounds, such as constituting a political question, lack of standing, or lack of ripeness**. n228 **In order to escape such dismissal, cases need to center on the meaning of the words within the statute, rather than on alleged presidential actions**. n229 [\*126] **If courts could better interpret the meaning of words within the Resolution, such as** "consult" n230 or "**hostilities**," n231 **the expectations of the president's actions would be more clearly defined. Thus, Congress would know when the president fails to meet the Resolution's requirements and could legitimately act in response to indiscretions.**

# 2AC

### A2: RoB

#### While you’re sitting on the sidelines the president is creating reality. We need to get on the frontlines and challenge the presidency. Otherwise, new realities will always be created and they won’t be very pretty for the marginalized. Challenging the cult the presidency is a key component of deliberation and an effective counter-narrative

* President controls counter-factual --- gets to reinterpret and shape reality

Nelson ’08, Dana D. Nelson, professor of English at Vanderbilt University, 2008, “Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People”, pg 1-2

IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, A BUSH administration official memorably asserted to New York Times reporter Ron Suskind, “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you with we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do 6” Suskind’s article “Without a Doubt” framed this assertion as the administration’s assessment of Left- leaning intellectuals, and it predictably outraged Bush’s political oppositions His administration was widely seen by Democrats as heedlessly unilateralist: this bald assertion of power seemed concisely to summarize Bush’s own philosophy and his scorn for those who disagree with him. But this is not just a simple summary of the Bush—Cheney—Rumsfeld— Wolfowìtz philosophy for dealing with political, opposition. Rather, it draws on a deep and relatively unnoticed tradition of expanding presidential powers that began in the age of George Washington. This expansion has come at times through the ambitions, machinations, and moxie of individual presidents — some of them impressively gifted governmental and political leaders. It has also come through the active and passive consent of citizens, the courts, and Congress. Because the president has come to symbolize both our democratic process and our national power, we tend to see him simultaneously as democracy’s heart (he will unify the citizenry) and its avenging sword (he will protect us from all external threats). Those beliefs, inculcated in us from our earliest days in school, reinforced by both popular culture and media coverage of government, politics, and foreign affairs, make us want to give the president more power, regardless of the constitutional checks and balances we also learned to treasure as schoolchildren.

#### Demystifying the Cult of the Presidency is Necessary to Allow for Diverse Opinions and Expertise. Presidential primacy generates antagonistic politics in the status quo

**Nelson ’08**, Dana D. Nelson, professor of English at Vanderbilt University, 2008, “Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People”, pg 139-143

**The militarization of our democratic politics fosters a Manichaean Worldview. You’re either with us or against us, on the side of the good or the axis of evil. It’s easy to attribute these politically reductive and vicious characterizations to the “other” side, but thinkers on both the right and the left have become infected with the knee-jerk habits of political demonization**. It is on such habits that “shouting head” television and radio have thrived, as well as a book industry that produces such titles as If Democrats Had Any Brains, They’d Be Republicans, and Rush Limbaugh Is a Big Fat Idiot. **These political actors** (in the fullest sense) **scorn reasoned deliberation and compromise. Instead, with an evangelical fervor, they denounce their opponents** (the losers) **in the shrillest and most aggressive terms possible. They maximize and overdraw political difference in order to vilify it. Demonology demands that your hero is my villain** (which helps explain opinion polls that, for instance, in 2007 showed 75 percent of Republicans approving Bush’s performance, as opposed to 8 percent of Democrats), **With such opponents, compromise is demeaning when it’s not unthinkable. With such opponents, no one can deliberate**. If you don’t agree with the president, this demonology teaches (and both Demo crats and Republicans have made this claim in the past twenty years), you should leave the country.

**The macho mystique of the commander in chief feeds the civil war atmosphere of U.S. democratic culture. The exaggerated and irremediable differences painted by its Manichaean pundits work to create a climate of political and social fear,** activating and feeding what political scientists have described as an “authoritarian dynamic” or “situation-sensitive” authoritarianism. Recent research shows “that the effect of an authoritarian disposition on partisanship has. .. increased markedly between 1992 and 2OO4” Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler’s study draws on four questions introduced in the 1992 National Election Study, which probe for two of three key authoritarian attitudes, submission and conventional ism (the third is aggression. Hetherington and Weiler, like fellow political scientist Bob Altemeyer; are interested in showing authoritarianism’s effect on current expressions of conservative partisanship. Others like Karen Stenner, caution that it’s important to distinguish between the authoritananism that is situationally manifested by those predisposed for whatever reason, toward authoritarianism, and the apparent authoritarianism of some kinds of conservatism. But **there is a growing consensus that normative threats and fears about bad leadership summon authoritarian behaviors into our political scene—exactly the kinds of threats cultivated and kept alive by our politics-as-war culture, and that cultivate the habit of mistaking the president as “our” commander in chief**; who policies we must honor, whether or not we like them.

As touted Senate strategies like the “nuclear option” suggest, and as analysts like Mann and Ornstein, and Crenson and Ginsberg, demonstrate, **key democratic political skills for consociation and deliberation are declining** in government. **Shouting-head culture has encouraged citizens who do want to talk politics - face-to--face or online — to seek these conversations only among those with whom they believe they’ll find agreement. But this reassuring habit only feeds the cycle of war culture.** Groups of like-minded people are highly susceptible to the phenomenon of group polarization, something legal scholar Cass Sunstein has recently described at length in Why Societies Need Dissent. In settings where a group shares basic leanings or opinions, deliberation tends to radicalize the opinion of the group and individuals within it, polarizing rather than moderating opinion. **Democratic deliberation needs civil injections of diverse opinion, different expertises, and diverging institutions that support civil dissent**. **Politics-as-war kills this possibility as it strangles citizens’ ability to imagine a richer, more active, and productively dissensual democratic community We can’t say that the mystique of the commander in chief causes all these ills, but we can say his macho symbolic presence certainly encourages them.**

Finally, politics-as-war spills over into our daily lives. The post-1965 trend toward social enclaving and gated communities crucially reinforçes tendencies toward political enclaving, as Bill Bishop so richly documents in his book, The Big Sort. **Politics-as-war has spawned culture wars and what the sociolinguist Deborah Tannen has described as “argument culture,” an agonistic, warlike stance that assumes all differences must be seen in oppositional terms and all decisions must be produced by adversariaist means. This attitude permeates our most mundane interactions.**

As Tannen notes, it’s become habitual to conceptualize joining a conver—sation as “leaping into the fray” rather than as “sharing ideas.” **Argument culture encourages Americans to approach every subject as though it were war**, a proclivity that feeds aggressive debate, “slash-and-burn” argumentative styles, and a winner-take-all attitude toward discussion that can inspire irrelevance and even dishonesty in routine interactions, **all in the name of “coming out on top.” Some people, clearly, are good at argument culture** and even thrive on it, **but for the rest, the energy required for routine defensiveness in argument culture is drawn away from more creative, generative enterprises. And those who have intelligent qualifications to contribute to debates, but fear being slaughtered in the war of words, withdraw, with them go vital, enriching insights.**

### Perm

***Methodologies are always imperfect – endorsing multiple epistemological frameworks can correct the flaws of each***

**Stern and Druckman 00** (Paul, National Research Council and Daniel, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution – George Mason University, International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “**critical** **multiplism**.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as **partial correctives** for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

#### This solves their argument best – their evidence is not exclusive – it’s a question of priority – the permutation remedies this by XXXXX while still doing the plan – any incommensurable epistemological issue is outweighed by the importance of a broad struggle against violence

Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature @ UC Berkley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, 2004, page 48

We could have several engaged intellectual debates going on at the same time and find ourselves joined in the fight against violence, without having to agree on many epistemological issues. We could disagree on the status and character of modernity and yet find ourselves joined in asserting and defending the rights of indigenous women to health care, reproductive technology, decent wages, physical protection, cultural rights, freedom of assembly. If you saw me on such a protest line, would you wonder how a postmodernist was able to muster the necessary “agency” to get there today? I doubt it. You would assume that I had walked or taken the subway! By the same token, various routes lead us into politics, various stories bring us onto the street, various kinds of reasoning and belief. We do not need to ground ourselves in a single model of communication, a single model of reason, a single notion of the subject before we are able to act. Indeed, an international coalition of feminist activists and thinkers—a coalition that affirms the thinking of activists and the activism of thinkers and refuses to put them into distinctive categories that deny the actual complexity of the lives in question— will have to accept the array of sometimes incommensurable epistemological and political beliefs and modes and means of agency that bring us into activism.

***The alt’s all-or-nothing choice fails --- small reforms like the plan are key to institutional change and getting others to sign on to the alt***

Erik Olin **Wright 7**, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations¶ The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the **viability of institutional alternatives** that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often ***depends upon the existence of smaller steps***, intermediate institutional innovations **that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values.** Institutional proposals which have an ***all-or-nothing quality*** to them are both ***less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems*** if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem.¶ Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level¶ earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone.¶ What we ideally want, therefore, are **intermediate reforms** that have two main properties: first, they concretely **demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of *convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable;*** and second, they ***enhance the capacity for action of people***, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and ***bring people together in problem-solving deliberations*** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”: reforms that are ***possible within existing institutions*** and that ***pragmatically solve real problems*** while at the same time **empowering people in ways which** ***enlarge their scope of action in the future.***

***We must use the institutions that exercise power to change them***

Lawrence **Grossburg**, University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Outta This Place, **1992**, p. 391-393

**The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized.** It is often **by directing opposition against specific institutions** that **power can be challenged.** The Left has assumed from some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. **The Left** does in fact need more visibility, but it also **needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making and power**. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. **It is not individuals who have produced** starvation and the other **social disgraces** of our world, **although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the system of organizations which in fact have the capacity** (as well as the moral responsibility) **to fight them.** Without such organizations, the only models of political commit­ment are self-interest and charity. Charity suggests that we act on behalf of others who cannot act on their own behalf. But we are all precariously caught in the circuits of global capitalism, and every­one’s position is increasingly precarious and uncertain. It will not take much to change the position of any individual in the United States, as the experience of many of the homeless, the elderly and the “fallen” middle class demonstrates. Nor are there any guarantees about the future of any single nation. We can imagine ourselves involved in a politics where acting for another is always acting for oneself as well, a politics in which everyone struggles with the resources they have to make their lives (and the world) better, since the two are so intimately tied together! For example, we need to think of affirmation action as in everyone’s best interests, because of the possibilities it opens. We need to think with what Axelos has described as a “planetary thought” which “would be a coherent thought—but not a rationalizing and ‘rationalist’ inflection; it would be a fragmentary thought of the open totality—for what we can grasp are fragments unveiled on the horizon of the totality. Such a politics will not begin by distinguishing between the local and the global (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. **Resistance is always a local struggle, even when** (as in parts of the ecology movement) **it is imagined to connect into its global structures of articulation**: Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, one is always acting both globally and locally: Think globally, act appropriately! Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency. “Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of imma­nence. This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a ques­tion of individual rights (i.e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up “trumping” politics, bringing it to an end. The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared “responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now.” The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democ­racy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. **The construction of an affective commonal­ity attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority.**

### A2 roleplaying bad

***We’re not roleplaying - fiat is a tool to allow debaters to imagine a world where the plan is enacted for the purpose of evaluating if we as citizens should support it – It would be impossible and irresponsible for debate to function any other way***

Michael **Eber**, former Director of Debate at Michigan State University, “Everyone Uses Fiat”, April 8th 20**05**, http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/edebate@ndtceda.com/1077700.html

**It is shocking to me how**, after literally a DECADE of debates, **no one seems to understand *what the hell fiat is***. **Policy teams foolishly defend "role playing" even though *they do not role play*.** And critique teams reject fiat even though almost every single K alternative relies on a utopian imaginary that necessitates a greater degree of fiat than the reformist Aff. **Debate is about *opinion formation, not role-playing. Affirmative policy teams do not pretend to BE the federal government. They merely IMAGINE the consequences of the government enacting the plan as a means of determining whether it SHOULD be done***. **All fiat represents is the step of imagining hypothetical enactment of the plan as an intellectual tool for deciding whether WE should endorse it.** "**How should we determine whether or not to ENDORSE lifting sanctions on Cuba?**" "**Well, what would happen if the government did that**?" "**Let's** ***IMAGINE*** **a world where sanctions are lifted**. **What would that world look like? Would it be better than the status quo**?" "Is that world better than competitive alternatives?" ***This conversation does NOT posit the discussants AS the federal government. They do not switch identities and act like Condaleeza*** and Rummy. ***They do not give up the agency to decide something for themselves - the whole point is simply to use the imagination of fiat to determine OUR OPINION.*** "**I think sanctions should be removed [by the government] because IT IS A GOOD IDEA. It would save lives**." "I think sanctions should not be removed because that policy would help Castro and make things worse" ***It is nonsensical to*** simultaneously ***say "Aff = fiat = bad"*** and then defend alternatives that are only coherent/debatable/endorsable BY USING THE IMAGINITIVE TOOL OF FIAT. "Our alternative is revolution against capitalism" "Why do that? How should we determine whether or not to ENDORSE revolution against capitalism?" "Well, what would happen if we did that?" "Let's IMAGINE a world of revolution against capitalism [or us demanding revolution, or whatever]. Would that be a good thing?" ***It is NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, and certainly irresponsible, to have a debate about whether to reject capitalism without imagining what would happen if we did***. It is also incoherent to say something like "we will defend the consequences of our plan, but not fiat." ***The imagination of "what would happen if" IS FIAT.*** If you want to make framework debates better, then never again utter the stupid phrases "pre-fiat" and "post-fiat."

#### The aff’s approach is a good starting point---normative policy prescriptions are educationally valuable

The 1AC is one that fulfills "deliberative citizenship" by advocating for deliberative politics

Richard Ellis et al 9, Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, degree completed December 1989, M.A. University of California, Berkeley, Political Science, 1984, B.A. University of California, Santa Cruz, Politics, 1982, Debating the Presidency: Conflicting Perspectives on the American Executive, p. google books

In 1969 the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky published a hefty reader on the American presidency. He prefaced it with the observation that “the presidency is the most important political institution in American life” and then noted the paradox that an institution of such overwhelming importance had been studied so little. “The eminence of the institution,” Wildavsky wrote, “is matched only by the extraordinary neglect shown to it by political scientists. Compared to the hordes of researchers who regularly descend on Congress, local communities, and the most remote foreign principalities, there is an extraordinary dearth of students of the presidency, although scholars ritually swear that the presidency is where the action is before they go somewhere else to do their research.”1 Political scientists have come a long way since 1969. The presidency remains as central to national life as it was then, and perhaps even more so. The state of scholarly research on the presidency today is unrecognizable compared with what it was forty years ago. A rich array of new studies has reshaped our understanding of presidential history, presidential character, the executive office, and the presidency’s relationship with the public, interest groups, parties, Congress, and the executive branch. Neglect is no longer a problem in the study of the presidency. In addition, those who teach about the presidency no longer lack for good textbooks on the subject. A number of terrific books explain how the office has developed and how it works. Although students gain a great deal from reading these texts, even the best of them can inadvertently promote a passive learning experience. Textbooks convey what political scientists know, but the balance and impartiality that mark a good text can obscure the contentious nature of the scholarly enterprise. Sharp disagreements are often smoothed over in the writing. The primary purpose of Debating the Presidency is to allow students to participate directly in the ongoing real-worldcontroversies swirling around the presidencyand to judge for themselves which side is right. It is premised philosophically on our view of students as active learners to be engaged rather than as passive receptacles to be filled. The book is designed to promote a classroom experience in which students debate and discuss issues rather than simply listen to lectures. Some issues, of course, lend themselves more readily to this kind of classroom debate. In our judgment, questions of a normative nature —asking not just what is, but what ought to be—are likely to foster the most interesting and engaging classroom discussions. So in selecting topics for debate, we generally eschewed narrow but important empirical questions of political science—such as whether the president receives greater support from Congress on foreign policy than on domestic issues—for broader questions that include empirical as well as normative components—such as whether the president has usurped the war power that rightfully belongs to Congress. We aim not only to teach students to think like political scientists, but also to encourage them to think like democratic citizens. Each of the thirteen issues selected for debate in this book’s second edition poses questions on which thoughtful people differ. These include whether the president should be elected directly by the people, whether the media are too hard on presidents, and whether the president has too much power in the selection of judges. Scholars are trained to see both sides of an argument, but we invited our contributors to choose one side and defend it vigorously. Rather than provide balanced scholarly essays impartially presenting the strengths and weaknesses of each position, Debating the Presidency leaves the balancing and weighing of arguments and evidence to the reader. The essays contained in the first edition of this book were written near the end of President George W. Bush’s fifth year in office; this second edition was assembled during and after Barack Obama’s first loo days as president. The new edition includes four new debate resolutions that should spark spirited classroom discussion about the legitimacy of signing statements, the war on terror, the role of the vice presidency, and the Twenty-second Amendment. Nine debate resolutions have been retained from the first edition and, wherever appropriate, the essays have been revised to reflect recent scholarship or events. For this edition we welcome David Karol, Tom Cronin, John Yoo, Lou Fisher, Peter Shane, Nelson Lund, Doug Kriner, and Joel Goldstein, as well as Fred Greenstein, who joins the debate with Stephen Skowronek over the importance of individual attributes in accounting for presidential success. In deciding which debate resolutions to retain from the first edition and which ones to add, we were greatly assisted by advice we received from many professors who adopted the first edition of this book. Particularly helpful were the reviewers commissioned by CQ Press: Craig Goodman of Texas Tech University, Delbert J. Ringquist of Central Michigan University, Brooks D. Simpson of Arizona State University, and Ronald W. Vardy of the University of Houston. We are also deeply grateful to chief acquisitions editor Charisse Kiino for her continuing encouragement and guidance in developing this volume. Among the others who helped make the project a success were editorial assistants Jason McMann and Christina Mueller, copy editor Mary Marik, and the book’s production editor, Gwenda Larsen. Our deepest thanks go to the contributors, not just for their essays, but also for their excellent scholarship on the presidency.

#### Our method is superior---debate is a key site to confront presidential war powers. The neg’s disconnect from debating political implications forfeits our ability to activate political agency to curtail violent governmental policies. Debating a time sensitive controversy like war powers is key to challenge conventional wisdom on the subject which checks securitization and exclusion

Kurr 13 – Ph.D. student in the Communication Arts & Sciences program at Pennsylvania State University and a coach for the Penn State Debate Society (9/5, UVA Miller Center & CEDA Public Debate Series, “Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers”, http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14)

Taken together, the connection between tournament competition and a public collaboration reorients the pedagogical function of debate. Gordon Mitchell and his colleagues comment on this possibility, “The debate tournament site’s potential to work as a translational pipeline for scholarly research presents unique opportunities for colleges and universities seeking to bolster their institutional infrastructure for undergraduate research” (Mitchell et al, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, the debate series affords competitors the opportunity to become part of the discussion and inform policymakers about potential positions, as opposed to the traditional reactionary format of hosting public debates at the season’s end. Empirically, these events had the effect of “giv[ing] voice to previously buried arguments” that “subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 107). Given the timeliness of the topic, these debates provide a new voice into the ongoing deliberation over war powers and help make the fruits of competitive research have a public purpose.

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public.

Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents.

In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231).

Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

### A2 law bad

#### Legal strategy is key—no matter what our orientation to the state is, the details of certain mechanisms to address problems predetermine the value of a moral stance—pre-req to dismantle oppression and colonial mindsets

Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)

Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. This disinvestment, I contend is critical for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 Because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, we might need to creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety.

#### Incremental reform of the law is better than pure rejection---the alternative infinitely replicates the SQ

Jefferey Pyle 99, Boston College Law School, J.D., magna cum laude, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C.L. Rev. 787

"Critique," however, never built anything, and liberalism, for all its shortcomings, is at least constructive. It provides broadly-accepted, reasonably well-defined principles to which political advocates may appeal in ways that transcend sheer power, with at least some hope of incremental success:26' Critical race theory would "deconstruct" this imperfect tradition, but offers nothing in its place.

An apt example of how unconstructive CRT is can be found in its approach to equality. To the extent that race-crits discuss "equality" at all, they do so less to advance tangible goals than to disparage liberalism's different approaches, including the ultimate goal of a society where race does not matter. 265 The race-crits are particularly hostile to the liberal ideal of "color blindness," expressed most eloquently by Martin Luther King's dream that his children "will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."266 To the race-crits, this integrationist goal of color-blind constitutionalism is not just naive or preinature. 2"7 In Neil Gotanda's words, it "supports the supremacy of white interests and must therefore be regarded as racist." !08 Unlike King, who saw affirmative action as a color-conscious means to a more inclusive, integrated nation ,"9 race-crits consider affirmative action an end in itself, more akin to an award of permanent damages than transitional assistance:270 To the race-crits, any doctrine that gets in the way of that end, including egalitarian colorblindness, is ipso facto "racist." 271

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Critical race theory's failure to address the difficulties of administering a reparations-based, "equality of result!' system leaves one with the impression that either they really are not. serious, or their invocation of "equality" is little more than an assertion of group interests. Indeed, the more pessimistic race-crits, like Derrick Bell, would be happiest if social reformers jettisoned the goal of "equality" altogether, because that goal "merely perpetuates our disempowerment."291 Illegal doctrine is to be judged solely by how it advances the interest of racial minorities, the race-crits implicitly dismiss any vision of equality that could aid other disadvantaged groups, or that could treat disadvantaged members of the racial majority with equal concern and respect.29' To the race-crits, the proper inquiry is not how the law lives up to aspirations or principles, but how it serves the interests of a constituen cy.297

In this respect, the race-crits are more political advocates than legal scholars.2"8 There is, of course, nothing wrong with being an advocate, and disadvantaged people certainly need advocates. But legal theories—the principles and ideas that guide the determination of legal outcomes—must transcend mere factional interests if they are to aid minorities. They must win the majority's acquiescence, if not its active support. So far, race-crits have not provided such a theory. CRT is only "scholarly resistance" that lives within, and indeed depends upon, the liberal legal order. 2"" Without liberalism to "critique," critical race theory would have little meaning. In the end, critical race theory could no more supplant liberalism than the mission statement of a political action committee could replace the Constitution.

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### \*\*\*A2 congress bad

#### Sweeping characterizations of the government as monolithically oppressive are essentialist and block progress

Goodsell '3 Charles, Professor Emeritus at [Virginia Tech](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Polytechnic_Institute_and_State_University)'s [Center for Public Administration and Policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Public_Administration_and_Policy) "The Case for Bureaucracy, Fourth Edition" orig. 1984 p. 8-10

**The descriptive category, then, is vast. It embraces** thousands of institutions **and** millions of people**. It incorporates an incredible variety of activities, from investigating child abuse to filling potholes to combating AIDS to negotiating international treaties and conducting wars. The very enormity of the category speaks eloquently of the critical importance of our subject. The vast range of organizations included cries out for thoughtful assessment of individual bureaucracies rather than characterization by stereotype.** Many readers will be aware of the sociological model of bureaucracy posited by Max Weber early in the past century. To Weber, a bureaucracy was an organization with specified functional attributes: large size; a graded hierarchy; formal rules; specialized tasks; written files; and employees who are salaried, technically trained, career-appointed, and assigned stated duties requiring expert knowledge. Weber regarded his model as an ideal type, useful for description and analysis. 5 **Many academic theorists and researchers contend that by possessing these characteristics, an organization tends automatically to exhibit certain patterns of behavior. These include rigidity, proceduralism, resistance to change, oppressive control of employees, dehumanized treatment of clients, indifference to citizen input, use of incomprehensible jargon, and tendencies toward empire building and concentration of power. These ascribed traits are, obviously, all pejorative. They also happen to spring, for the most part, from predisposed beliefs about large organizations rather than from empirical study.** When academic writers on bureaucracy reflect negatively on the consequences of the "Weberian model," they are often being not neutral social scientists at all but ideological critics of hierarchical organization-a position shared by many intellectuals. As if by a kind of original sin embedded in its organizational form, bureaucracy is seen as automatically and perpetually condemned to incompetence and antidemocratic excess. Returning to my own use of the word, I do not deny that much if not most of American public administration is made up of organizations that answer to many if not all of Weber's basic structural characteristics. Yes, steps are often taken to flatten chains of command, create flexible roles and teams, empower employees and citi zens, and stress service to citizens. Still, most public sectororganizations and jurisdictions continue to feature differentiated levels of office, bounded areas of authority, internal rules, electronic or paper files, career or at least long-term employees, and professional experts of one kind or another. So, to that extent, most administrative components of U.S. government are still essentially "bureaucracies" in the Weberian sense - whatever that may mean in terms of resultant behavior. (They are not, however, necessarily very big, as we discover later.) Let me make myself abundantly clear. I do not deny that selected attempts to deemphasize these structural characteristics in our public administration institutions would be helpful in many instances. **I do not, however, accept the deterministic thought implicit in theories of bureaucracy that automatically equate *any* substantial presence of** Weber's characteristics with incompetence or **rigidity, dehumanized or oppressive conduct, or imperialistic behavior. Hence I am not, obviously, using the term *bureaucracy* in the typical pejorative sense.** To put the matter another way, **my debating opponents and I disagree not over whether American public administration is essentially bureaucratic, but over whether that means it is inevitably pathological**. 6